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THE ADVISORY OPINION IN
NORTH CAROLINA
PRESTON W. EDSALL*
"As generally understood, the advisory opinion is an opinion
rendered by the highest judicial officers in the state, acting as
individuals and not in a judicial capacity, in response to a re-
quest for information as to the state of the law or counsel as to
the constitutionality of proposed action, coming from the legis-
lative or executive branches of the government.
"We conclude that there is a presumption in favor of the ad-
visory opinion as a useful instrument of government. It seems
justified in theory; it has proved its value in practice."
-Albert R. Ellingwood.
"It must be remembered that advisory opinions are not
merely advisory opinions. They are ghosts that slay."
-Felix Frankfurter.
The suggestion made last August that the right of the "Dixiecrats"
to a place on the North Carolina ballot might be determined by seeking
an advisory opinion from the justices of the Supreme Court drew atten-
tion once again to a century-old function of the judges. It was on
January 18, 1849, that the members of the North Carolina Supreme
Court gave to a coordinate branch of the state government what is be-
lieved to have been their first advisory opinion.1 Today, after a sone;"
what intermittent development, the advisory function has become a
powerful factor in legislation and administration. Available to the gov-
ernor and to the General Assembly or either of its houses, advisory
opinions have guided legislative and executive action on many points of
constitutional and statutory interpretation. Tense political circumstances
have most frequently motivated requests for opinons. In a few instances
there has been sharp public criticism of the opinions themselves and of
the propriety of the judicial action in rendering them, but, in general,
the advisory job has been performed so unobtrusively that distinguished
out-of-state jurists and authorities on state government have long sol-
emnly proclaimed that the advisory opinion practice has "waned" or
"atrophied" in North Carolina or even that it has been renounced by
* Chairman, Department of History and Political Science, N. C. State Col-
lege; B.S., New York University; A.M., Ph.D., Princeton University; formerly
special attorney, U. S. Department of Justice, research expert, The National
Archives, senior negotiator, U. S. Civil Service Commission. Editor-author,
Journal of the Courts of Common Right and Chancery of East New Jersey,
1683-1702 (American Legal History Society, 1937).
'Waddell v. Berry, 31 N. C. 516 (1848), 40 N. C. 440 (1848).
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the justices themselves.2 The statements of these authorities truthfully
apply to several of the nine states where advisory opinions were once
available and are no longer so ;3 but North Carolina remains one of
ten states in which the advisory function is far from moribund.
Admittedly, when compared to the advisory opinion practice of
Massachusetts, that of North Carolina is small in quantity and limited
in subject matter. Nevertheless it is important and will probably be-
come more so unless steps are taken to curb it. On at least twenty-one
occasions, seven of them since Professor Frankfurter announced the
"atrophy" of the device in North Carolina, formal requests have been
addressed to the Court or its members. These requests were distributed
chronologically as follows: 1849, 1863, 1866, 1869 (two requests, the
replies to the second coming in 1870), 1871, 1894, 1897, 1917, 1919,
1921, 1925 (two requests), 1929, 1933 (two requests), 1934, 1944,
1946, and 1947 (two requests). ' Eight requests originated in joint
Examples of the misconception concerning advisory opinions in North Car-
olina are many. E,LINGWOOD, DEPARTMENTAL COOPERATION IN STATE GOVERN-
MENT 69 (1918), apparently thought no such opinions were rendered after the
Legislative Tenure case in 1870. Felix Frankfurter, Advisory Opinions, in 1
EkCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES, 447, declares that the practice of giving
advisory opinions has "atrophied" in North Carolina. MACDONALD, AMERICAN
STATE GOVERNMENT AND ADMINISTRATION 252 n. 38 (3d ed. 1945), lists North
Carolina among the states that "have made provision in their constitutions for
advisory opinions" and then, strangely, includes this state among those "where
advisory opinions were once given without constitutional or statutory authority"
but in which "the practice has long since been discontinued." Relying on Pro-
fessor Frankfurter, the author of Advisory Opinions on Constitutionality of Pro-
posed Legislation, PROBLEMS RELATING TO LEGisLATIvE ORGANIZATION AND POWERS
296 (see bibliographical note following the text of this article), asserts that in
North Carolina the court now "expressly" denies its power to render advisory
opinions, and GRAVEs, AMERICAN STATE GOVERNMENT 707 n. 4 (3d ed. 1946), cites
the above mentioned article and says that "the system" of giving advisory opinions
"has fallen into disuse in . . . North Carolina" and that the Supreme Court "now
expressly" denies its "power to render" such opinions. BROMAGE, STATE GOVERN-
MENT AND ADMINISTRATION 307-308 (1936), comments on the refusal of the Su-
preme Court to advise the legislature in 1929 and concludes that in North Carolina
the advisory opinion practice "has waned." It is not without interest that each
of the quoted statements was written at a time when the advisory function was
very active. Aumann, The Supreme Court and the Advisory Opinion, 4 OHIO ST.
L. J. 32 (1937), says that the power to render advisory opinions has been "ex-
plicitly denied" in North Carolina and cites the Legislative Tenure case, 64 N. C.
785, 792 (1870).
'Judges no longer give advisory opinions in Connecticut, Kentucky, Minnesota,
Missouri, Nebraska, New York, Pennsylvania, Oklahoma, and Vermont.
" I furnished a number of hitherto unreported advisory opinions for publica-
tion in the North Carolina Reports, and these appeared in 227 N. C. 715-723
(1947). The communication In re Terms of Supreme Court, id. at 723-724, was
added by the Reporter. It does not appear to me to be properly classified as an
advisory opinion. Neither in my judgment, should the discussion by Justice
Rodman, 66 N. C. 655 (1872), have been listed by the Reporter (227 N. C. 724,
725) as an advisory opinion. This discussion was prepared in connection with
Winslow v. Weith, 66 N. C. 432 (1872). When this case was decided on narrower
grounds than those advanced by Rodman, his opinion was ordered to be published
in the hope that the members of the bar might be prepared to aid the court in
any future case involving the points treated by the learned justice. See note, id.
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resolutions of the General Assembly; four came from the Senate alone
and one from the House of Representatives; eight requests were made
by the governor, four of them since 1933. In every instance except the
first one in 1925, replies have been made in writing and only two, or
perhaps three, requests have failed to produce opinions dealing with
the questions raised.
UNDER THE FIRST STATE CONSTITUTION
Today the written constitutions of seven states provide for advisory
opinions and statute law furnishes an acceptable foundation in two
others. 4 In North Carolina, however, not positive law, but usage or
custom, now well-established, provides the basis. The custom has
emerged from the cooperative labors of those who have sought and
those who have granted opinions, and its continued existence depends
upon the attitude of the justices toward the function.
The first opinion, Waddell v. Berry.-All constitutional usages have
their beginnings and this one started in 1849, while the Constitution of
1776 (as revised in 1835) was still the fundamental law of North Car-
olina. The Senate, in a complicated contested election case in which
Hugh Waddell challenged the right of John Berry to the senatorial seat
from Orange County, became sharply divided over the meaning of the
term "freeholder" as used by the State Constitution in setting the quali-
fications of electors. A series of questions were therefore formulated
and, on January 17, 1849, passed along by the Senate "to the Supreme
Court... with a request that the said Court would furnish the Senate
as soon as practicable, their opinion.' 5 Thus, in an almost casual
fashion, appeared on the door-step of the Court, over which Chief Jus-
tice Thomas Ruffin presided, an opportunity to broaden its functions by
giving the desired advice or to establish the rule that the court would
deal only with litigated cases.
at 432. Since the appearance of 227 N. C., I have found a number of additional
documents, including one advisory opinion, and these appear below in notes 13, 23,
24, and 30.
' Constitutions establish the advisory function in Massachusetts, New Hamp-
shire, Maine, Rhode Island, Florida, Colorado, and South Dakota. Under the
Florida and South Dakota clauses only the governor is authorized to ask advice;
otherwise both executive and legislature are included in the authorizations. Mis-
souri had a constitutional provision concerning advisory opinions from 1865 to
1875. Statutory provisions established the advisory function in Delaware, Min-
nesota, Vermont, and Alabama, but the Minnesota act was never operative and
the Vermont statute was repealed.
The persistence of error in connection with the foundation of the advisory
opinion function in North Carolina is illustrated by the statement of AUsTiN F.
MACDONALD, supra note 2, and by the statement of F. A. Ogg and P. 0. Ray that
North Carolina is one of ten states in which advisory opinions are provided for
either by the state constitution or by statute. INTRODUcrioN TO AMERfcAN Gov-
ERNMENT 997 (9th ed. 1948).5 N. C. SENATE JoURNAL, 1848-49, p. 229. January 17, 1849.
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.Ample precedent existed for either line of action. The justices of
the United States Supreme Court had refused to advise President Wash-
ington on legal questions in 1793. 6 The justices had told the President
that the legislative, executive, and judicial departments "are in certain
respects checks upon each other" and that they themselves were "judges
of a court in the last resort." These facts, they wrote, "are considera-
tions which afford strong arguments against the propriety of our extra-
judicially deciding the questions" submitted. This view would appar-
ently restrict judges to litigated cases as the only legitimate subject
matter of the judicial function in the absence of a positive mandate.
Had Ruffin and his colleagues chosen this course, they could have
pointed, as Jay and his associates could not, to specific constitutional
language. "The legislative, executive, and supreme judicial powers of
government ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other,"
read the State Constitution. 7
Equally good precedent existed, however, for the action taken by
the North Carolina judges. That the advisory opinion was not neces-
sarily incompatible with a practical separation of powers was clearly
suggested by the fact that the constitutions of Massachusetts, New
Hampshire, and Maine contained stronger statements on separation than
the Constitution of North Carolina and yet, at the same time, specifically
vested an advisory function in the judges of their highest courts.8 Nor
C1 WARREN, THE SUPREmE COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 108-111 (1922).
On Aug. 20, 1787, Pinckney proposed the following to the Federal Constitutional
Convention: "Each branch of the legislature, as well as the supreme executive,
shall have authority to require the opinions of the Supreme Judicial Court upon
important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions." 2 FARRAND, RECORDS OF
THE FEDE.L CONVENTION 341 (1911). N3othing came of this proposal, which was
obviously modeled on the advisory opinion provision of the Massachusetts Con-
stitution, post. note 8. Albertsworth, in a thoughtful article, maintains that, al-
though the U. S. Supreme Court does not render advisory opinions in a precise
sense, it does, after a manner, advise through the media of dissenting opinions and
judicial dicta, and he favors the addition of a formal advisory function to the duties
of the Court. Advisory Functions in the Federal Supreme Court, 23 GEORGETOWN
L. J. 643-670 (1935).
' Declaration of Rights, N. C. CoNsT., §4 (1776).8 MAss. CoNsT., Pt. I, Art. XXX (1780): "In the government of this com-
monwealth the legislative shall never exercise the executive and judicial powers,
or either of them: the executive shall never exercise the legislative and judicial
powers, or either of them: the judicial shall never exercise the legislative and
executive powers, or either of them: to the end it may be a government of laws
and not of men."-3 THORPE, FEDERAL AND STATE CONSrTrIToNs 1893 (1904).
Pt. II, Ch. III, Art. II: "Each branch of the legislature, as well as the governor
and council, shall have the authority to require the opinions of the justices of the
supreme judicial court, upon important questions of law and upon solemn occa-
sions." Id. at 1905.
N. H. CoNsT., Pt. I, Art. XXXVII (1792): "In the government of this State,
the three essential powers thereof, to wit, the legislative, executive, and judicial,
ought to be kept as separate from, and independent of, each other as the nature
of free government will admit, or as is consistent with that chain of connection
that binds the whole fabric of the constitution in one indissoluble bond of union
and amity."-4 id. at- 2475. Pt. II, §LXXIV: "Each branch of the legislature,
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was the advisory function restricted in 1849 to states whose constitu-
tions provided for it. The function also existed in Pennsylvania and
New York and had been exercised in the latter state as recently as
1846.' The practice of the judges in these states obviously might,
therefore, have been used by Chief Justice Ruffin and his brethren to
buttress their own action.
There is, however, no evidence that the North Carolina judges enter-
tained any serious qualms in responding to the Senate. No attempt was
made to argue the pros and cons of advisory opinions; not one prece-
dent was cited to give the sanction of experience to the new departure.
Instead the judges placed their response on a narrow base and one over
which they would have full future control. "The Resolution of the
Senate . . . requesting the Judges of the Supreme Court to furnish
the Senate with their opinions on certain questions . . . was laid before
the Judges on the evening of yesterday," wrote the Chief Justice on
January 18.
"Although not strictly an act of official obligation, which
could not be declined, yet from the nature of the questions, and
the purposes to which the answers are to be applied-being
somewhat of a judicial character-the Judges have deemed it a
duty of courtesy and respect to the Senate, to consider the
points submitted to them and to give their opinions thereon."'1
Several points in this statement should be especially noted. First, the
response disregards the fact that the request was for the opinion of the
Supreme Court and treats the matter as though a request had been made
for the views of the judges. Second, the response is made from con-
siderations of courtesy and respect and not from legal obligation. Third,
the nature of the questions and the prospective use of the replies are
as well as the governor and council, shall have authority to require the opinions
of the justices of the superior court upon questions of law, and upon solemn
occasions." Id. at 2486.
ME. CONST., Art. III, §1 (1819): "The powers of this government shall be
divided into three district departments, the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial,"
and, §2: "No person belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any
of the powers properly belonging to either of the others, except in cases herein
expressly directed and permitted."-3 id. at 1651. Art. VI, §3: "They [the jus-
tices of the Supreme Judicial Court] shall be obliged to give their opinion upon
important questions of law, and upon solemn occasions, when required by the
Governor, Council, Senate, or House of Representatives." Id. at 1659.
Rhode Island, the only other state having, in 1849, an advisory opinion pro-
vision in its constitution, had only a few words on the separation of powers. R. I.
CoNsT., Art. III (1842) : "The powers of the government shall be distributed into
three departments: the legislative, executive, and judicial." 6 id. at 3226.
9 ELLINGWOOD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 64-68; JOHN ALEXANDER JAMESON, THE
CONSTITUTION.L CONVENTION 364 (3d ed. 1873) ; id. appendix D, pp. 543-546.
1031 N. C. 518 (1848). The Associate Justices were Frederick Nash and
Richmond M. Pearson.
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
noted. Each of these points might obviously prove useful should other
requests follow.
The questions put by the Senate-that is whether the. bargainor in
a deed of trust, the trustee under a deed of trust, or a cestui que trust
might lawfully vote if the land involved was of the minimum fifty acre
size-all turned on the question whether the estates involved were free-
holds. Without entering into the finely spun argument of the advisory
opinion, it is sufficient to say that the answer was largely negative. The
judges recognized that there might be objection to their conclusions
on the ground that they deprived land of representation. The right to
vote, however, depended upon a freehold estate in land and might go
unexercised or be alienated. Indeed, said the opinion, there was already
much land on which no one voted or could vote. °a
The opinions of 1863 and 1866.-The advisory opinion function
established in Waddell v. Berry was activated on only two other occa-
sions before the adoption of the present State Constitution: In 1863, at
the request of Governor Vance, the judges gave their opinion that the
office of adjutant general, which the legislature had declared vacant but
to which Brig. Gen. James G. Martin laid claim as the lawful incum-
bent, was vacant and might be filled by gubernatorial appointment."1
They made Waddell v. Berry their precedent and carefully stated that
"we do not act as a Court, but merely as judges of the Court." They
were, wrote Chief Justice Pearson, 12
"induced to take this action, and felt not only at liberty to do so,
but conceived it was in some measure our duty thus to aid a
coordinate department of the Government, because we were in-
formed by.. . the Governor, that the subject would in that way
be relieved from all further embarrassment, and that the public
interest required that it should be adjusted sooner than it could
be done by the regular mode of proceeding in court. .. ."
Three years later, the judges, again speaking through the Chief Justice
defined for Governor Worth the word crime as used in the Federal
interstate rendition act of 1793.13
10a Id. at 520-527.
"1 In the matter of J. G. Martin, 60 N. C. 153 (1863). Governor's request,
March 2, and justices' reply, March, 11, 1863. N. C. Pub. Laws 1862-63, p. 51.1260 N. C. 156 (1863).
In the matter of Win. H. Hughes, 61 N. C. 57, 64 (1867). The advisory opin-
ion is quoted at the outset of Chief, justice Pearson's elaborate opinion in a habeas
corpus proceeding concerning Hughes and is dated June 21, 1866. I find no con-
clusive evidence that the advisory 'opinion had any immediate connection with
Hughes. Governor Worth did, however, have considerable difficulty with the
Hughes case, as is shown by numerous entries in his letter book between May
1866 and January 1867. The following request for the advisory opinion of 1866
is here for the first time published. It does not mention Hughes and its date
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UNDER THE CONSTITUTION OF 1868
The Homestead opinion.-Such then was the status of the advisory
opinion when the Constitution of 1868 went into operation. And under
the new Constitution, it at first appeared that advisory opinions would
no longer be available or, at least, would prove less readily available.
For when, in January 1869, the General Assembly asked "the Supreme
Court" whether the homestead and personal property exemptions pro-
vided in Article X of the new Constitution applied against debts con-
tracted before the ratification of that Constitution, it met prompt and
decisive rebuff. Speaking through Chief Justice Pearson, who had par-
ticipated in all previous advisory opinions, the justices notified the
General Assembly that the view which they took "of their constitutional
duties" forbade compliance with the legislative request for counsel. And
why so? Because, wrote the Chief Justice, "the functions of this court
are restricted to cases constituted before it. We are not at liberty to
prejudge questions of law." 14
Had Pearson stopped here, the day of the advisory opinion might
indeed have been ended in North Carolina. But he went on to dis-
tinguish the pending request from that of 1849:
"In the contested election between Waddell and Berry, the
Judges . . . on request of the Senate, after much hesitation,
expressed an opinion in regard to the qualification of voters.
That, however, is the only instance in which it was ever done,
and it was put on the ground that the questions could not come
before the Court in a judicial form. The questions set out in the
does not indicate any necessary connection with him (Jonathan Worth Letter
Book, 1865-67, p. 130):
Executive Dept. of N. C.
Raleigh, June 20th 1866.
To The Judges of the Supreme Court of North Carolina-
For my guidance as Executive of North Carolina, I respectfully ask your
opinion on certain points of construction growing out of the Act of Congress
respecting fugitives from justice.
By the provisions of this Act, a person charged, as provided in this Act, with
having committed "Treason, felony, or other crime" in any State, may be demanded
by the Governor of the State in which such crime is so alleged to have been
committed, from the Governor of any other State in which the criminal may
have taken refuge.
Do the words "other crime" embrace every offence (including petty misde-
meanors,) made indictable in the criminal courts? If not, what class of offences
is embraced under the words "other crime!'?
In determining what is "crime," am I to look to the Common law, or the
Statutes of the State in which the offence was committed, or to the criminal law
of this State, when the criminal has taken refuge here?
Jonathan Worth,
Govr of N. C.
"' The request appears in N. C. Pub. Laws 1868-69, p. 703, and the reply in
N. C. SENATE JOURNAL, 1868-69, pp. 219-220, and both may now be found in 227
N. C. 715-716 (1947).
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resolutions [now] under consideration, not only may, but in all
probability will, come before us for decision.' 141
Was it to be understood from this language that advisory opinions
would not be available in the future? Or that they might be available
if, in the opinion of the justices, the questions raised could not come
before them in a litigated case? Pearson's statement, in which it is
presumed all his brethren concurred, left to the future the answer to
these questions.
Legislative tenure opinion.-The unanimity displayed in the Home-
stead case proved temporary, for controversy soon broke out among the
justices over the constitutionality of advisory opinions. The catalyst in
the dispute was a request by the General Assembly made in December
1869 for an indication of "its [the Court's] construction of the consti-
tutional provisions relating" "to the tenure of office of members of this
General Assembly" if the subject should come up "in due course of
law."'15 Three carefully prepared replies were returned in answer to,
or in evasion of, this question. One, upholding the right of the justices
to give advice under appropriate circumstances and declaring the tenure
of the General Assembly of 1868 to be limited to two years, was written
by Chief Justice Pearson and concurred in by Associate Justice Dick;
another reply, somewhat ambiguous in character, bore Associate Justice
Rodman's name; and the third, from the pen of Associate Justice
Reade, condemned the advisory opinion practice altogether. Justice
Settle in a fourth reply simply declined to express an opinion. The
reasoning of the Pearson, Rodman, and Reade replies is important to
this discussion. Chief Justice Pearson complied fully with the legis-
lative request. The Chief Justice was, he said, "relieved from all doubt"
concerning the right of the justices to advise the legislature in the pres-
ent instance "by the precedent in . . . Waddell v. Berry." That case
and the present one seemed of the same character to Pearson, though
of different magnitudes in that Waddell v. Berry had involved but one
Senate seat whereas the present problem involved all the seats in both
houses. Pearson also deemed the interstate rendition opinion of 1866
in point, but, said he, "the action of the Justices of this Court in de-
clining to express an opinion, at the request of the General Assembly,
in regard to a Homestead Act affecting preexisting debts, is not relevant
.. for it is put on the ground that the question [on which advice had
114 Id. at 716. See Jacobs v. Smallwood, 63 N. C. 112 (1869) and Hill v.
Kessler, id. at 438 (1869) for cases relating to the same general problem raised
by the request for the advisory opinion concerning the Homestead article of the
Constitution.
5 Opinions of the Justices of the Supreme Court in Regard to the Term of
Office of the General Assembly That was Elected in April, 1868, 64 N. C. 785(1870).
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then been asked] involved 'the rights of property,' and 'would in all
probability come before the Court for decision.'
16
Justice Rodman's opinion was apparently finished before either of
the others but it occupies ground somewhat between them.' 7 "The Con-
stitution has wisely separated the judicial from the political departments
of the government," he declared and continued:
"The sole duty of the Judges is to decide controversies be-
tween parties concerning their rights under the law; and in the
case of the Justices of the Supreme Court, this duty is limited
to such cases as come before that Court on appeal. * * * The
judiciary is set apart, in order that in all the revolutions of
political power, it may pass without bias on questions of private
right. The reasons which induced the framers of the Constitu-
tion to confine judicial duty within the limits mentioned, are
equally strong to restrain the Legislature from asking the
judges from doing so [sic], except on occasions of the most
manifest necessity."
The members of the General Assembly in their request had not indi-
cated that, were they advised that their terms would expire in 1870,
they would act on the judges' advice. If there should result
"a contest between rival bodies for the possession of the legis2
lative power, . . . it must be obvious that nothing could be more
unfortunate for the State, than for the Supreme Court to have
made itself, in advance [,] the partisan of either. Courts must
recognize the actual possessors of political power without inquiry
into the lawfulness of their possession.
* * * * * * * * * *
[The question presented by the legislature] is an exclusively
political one. It.can never . ..be made a legal question, or a
subject of judicial determination. Its ultimate decision must rest
with the political departments... and any attempt by the courts
to prejudge it, or influence it, at the request of either of them
[the governor or the legislature, as the political departments],
would be an encroachment on their powers, opposed at least to the
spirit of the Constitution, and hurtful in its consequences. I am,
therefore, constrained, respectfully, to decline expressing any
opinion professing to be either judicial or legal, on the question
presented. If I could suppose that the Legislature desired my
opinion as an individual merely, I should consider myself at lib-
erty to give it on this as on any other subject."
Then follows a lecture designed to teach the General Assembly by
example how to proceed in deciding its tenure problem. In it Rodman
strongly advises his inquisitors to seek out and follow the meaning of
the people when they adopted the Constitution. "If you should con-
a Pearson's opinion appears id. at 785-791.
'- Rodman's reply appears id. at 793-795.
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clude that the people supposed they were electing you for two years
only, you would not hesitate about your course. And even if you should
be left in doubt, it seems to me that a wise and becoming policy would
require you to give to the people the benefit of the doubt." This is
undoubtedly wise counsel, but it cannot possibly be regarded as legal
advice.
Rodman's position when examined critically seems to be rather
strongly faced against advisory opinions. Judicial duty is limited to the
field of litigation; only "on occasions of the most manifest necessity"
should the legislature ask the judges to over-step this limitation. Judges
even in such cases should refuse to answer "political" questions. Rod-
man's language shows clearly that he regarded these restrictions as
applying alike to the Court and to its members in their capacity as
justices. When he said he would feel free to express his views "as
an individual merely," he obviously meant that, when he assumed his
judicial post, he had not surrendered his right to speak as a private
citizen. He certainly did not at this time take Pearson's view that,
while the Court could not speak as a Court, its members could speak
as justices.
Justice Reade took sharp issue With Chief Justice Pearson and, un-
like Rodman, uttered no words that can be construed in a manner favor-
able to the giving of advisory opinions under any exigency. His Chief's
treatment of the precedents did not impress Reade:18 "I had sup-
posed," he said, referring to the Homestead refusal, that "our action then
was decisive, and that it would be a precedent on all future occasions."
Both precedents cited by Pearson antedated the new Constitution and,
in Reade's judgment, could not properly be used to justify the rendering
of advisory opinions under it, because
"the Court is not constituted now as then. The duties and
powers of the old Court were not prescribed in the Constitution
at all. That was done by act of the Legislature. It may be that
the Legislature had the power to make it the duty of the Judges
to give their opinions when asked for; and although the act which
organized the Court did not impose such duty, yet, if it might
have been done by that act, then it might have been done by any
subsequent act. And, treating a request that they would, as a
command that they should, the giving the opinion became, not a
courtesy, but a duty."
Reade might have added that the requests for advice cited by Pearson
did not come from the General Assembly, which alone under Reade's
doctrine might have commanded, but originated in the first instance with
one house thereof and in the second with the governor, who certainly
possessed no power to command the judges.
" Reade's reply appears id. at 791-793.
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Unlike its predecessor, the new Court was establishd and its duty
prescribed by the Constitution of 1868, and, Reade pointed out, the new
Constitution "does not make it the duty of the Court to give its opinion
to the Legislature, except in the instance of claims against the State.
And is not the requiring it in this one instance, the same as to forbid
it in all others ?"
Reade's main argument, however, was based upon the separation of
powers clause which had been carried over from the old Constitution
into the new.19 To him this clause meant that no one of the great de-
partments-legislative, executive, judicial-should "exercise the func-
tions, nor influence or control" another. In view of this prohibition,
Reade rejected the easy-going view that to advise or not to advise was
"a mere question of propriety" and that he was free to respond or re-
main silent at pleasure. "I think it is substantially an interference with
the legitimate business of the Legislature, and that the Constitution
forbids it." The strength of the learned justice's conviction on this
point led him to declare that the separation of powers clause "did forbid"
the members of the old Court quite as much as their successors to give
advice. Concerning his own participation in the last advisory opinion
under the old Constitution, Justice Reade said simply: "I now doubt
whether it was proper."
The argument that advisory opinions were given as a courtesy to a
coordinate branch of the government was inadequate to justify a breach
in the wall between departments: "Nor is the objection met by saying
that we do not meddle with the Legislature officiously, but only cour-
teously, and at their request. The Legislature has no more right to
ask, than we have to answer. We must let each other alone--'forever
separate and distinct.'"
The suggestion that the justices might advise the Legislature as indi-
viduals rather than as justices or as the Court seemed evasively unreal-
istic to Reade. "This," said he," may evade the letter of the difficulty,
but it leaves its spirit in full force. And, with my convictions, to evade,
is to break the Constitution." Furthermore, the request for advice did
not come before the justices as individuals. "We are asked how we will
'decide' the question 'when it comes before us lawfully.' And in what-
ever form we might answer, the Legislature and the public will under-
stand it to be the opinion of the Supreme Court."
Reade thought the whole operation but an effort on the part of the
General Assembly to delegate a legislative function to the justices. The
desire of the legislators to act on the fullest information was under-
21 Reade quoted the separation of powers clause incorrectly. Where the clause
actually says the three powers "ought to be" separate and distinct, he says "shall
be."
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standable, but "legislators are responsible to their constituents. They
cannot shift that responsibility. *** I think the Justices are forbidderi
to interfere."
Both Ellingwood, the outstanding authority on advisory opinions
generally, and the North Carolina Supreme Court have attached great
importance to the 1870 opinions, but for divergent and somewhat erro-
neous reasons. Ellingwood wrote in 1918, apparently without any
knowledge of the several advisory opinions rendered after 1870. He
regarded the action of the justices in 1870 as a rebuff and, because of
his somewhat puzzling unawareness of subsequent events, incorrectly
declared that "this rebuff apparently discouraged the legislature from
further interrogations-and the governor as well." 20  The Supreme
Court, in expounding the advisory function in 1929, took the view
that the justices of 1870 had been divided, three supporting and two
opposing the advisory practice. 2 ' Actually, as the record shows, the
division was more truly three against to two for advising the legis-
lature in this case, for Justice Rodman's reply places him clearly with
the opponents.
The constitutional convention opinion, 1871.-Neither Ellingwood
nor the Supreme Court of 1929 would have written as they did had they
been aware of the next episode: The Conservatives gained control of
the legislature in 1870 and moved swiftly to reform the government.
In an effort to bring about a revision of the Constitution of 1868, which
they regarded as a cause of much of their trouble, they drove through
the legislature a bill providing for a popular vote on the question of a
constitutional convention.22 Lieutenant Governor Caldwell, as presiding
officer of the Senate, had attempted to block the bill when it was before
that body by insisting that the Constitution required a two-thirds major-
ity on such a measure, but the Senate overruled him.m When the bill
2
oELLINGWOOD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 69.
2 In the Matter of Advisory Opinions, 196 N. C. 828, 829 (1929). See be-
low, p. 318.2
'
2N. C. Pub. Laws 1870-71, c. LXIII, pp. 119-125 (Feb. 8).
2 3 HAmILTON, REcoxsTRucTIoN IN NORTH CAROLINA 564-565 (1914). In 1871
the Amending Article of the Constitution merely provided that "No Convention
of the people shall be called by the General Assembly unless by the concurrence
of two-thirds of all the members of each House of the General Assembly." The
Act of February 8, 1871, did not, in the opinion of its supporters, actually call a
convention but merely submitted to the people the question "Convention or No
Convention." Such a submission, they maintained, did not come within the limita-
tions of the Amending Article. How the justices dealt with this argument may be
seen in their advisory opinion: (Governors' Papers, Tod R. Caldwell, Dec.-May,
1870-71; Governors' Letter Books, Tod R. Caldwell, 1870-74, pp. 57-58.)
State of North Carolina
Supreme Court
Raleigh, Feb. 11, 1871
To his Excellency Gov. Caldwell
Sir: In reply to your communication of the 9th inst., I have the honor to say:
The Chief Justice, and Justices Rodman, Dick and Settle are of the opinion that
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was finally adopted and ratified, Caldwell had replaced Holden as gov-
ernor. The act imposed certain obligations on the governor and these
he was reluctant to perform. "I am forced to the conclusion," he de-
clared, "that it [the act] is in direct conflict with the Constitution of
the State, which I have taken a solemn oath to support."' '  He there-
fore betook himself "to the great fountain of law in North Carolina
and sought information from the Supreme Court on this vital ques-
tion."2- The new governor explained carefully to the justices the pre-
the act to which you refer, is in violation of the constitution.
All legislative power is vested in the General Assembly. Calling a convention
is an act of legislation. It follows that no convention can be called unless it be
done by the General Assembly.
The people have reserved to themselves no power of Legislation. It follows
that a convention cannot be called by a vote of the people, nor will such voting
enable the General Assembly to call a convention in a manner not authorized by
the constitution.
Justice Reade, for the reason stated by him, when the opinion of the Justices
was requested, by the General Assembly in regard to the tenure of office [,] de-
dines to give an opinion.
Upon the several questions in regard to your duty provided you believe the
act to be unconstitutional, the Justices do not feel at liberty to offer any opinion.
Very respectfully &c &c
R. M. Pearson Ch.J.S.C.
When the Constitutional Convention of 1875 revised the amending article it made
Caldwell's contention into law.
" Governor Caldwell to the Justices, Feb. 9, 1871. Caldwell's request appears
in Governors' Letter Books, Tod R. Caldwell, 1870-74, pp. 56-57, and is as follows:
Executive Department,
State of North Carolina,
To the Honorable Raleigh, 9th February 
1871.
The Chief justice and the Associate Justices
of the Supreme Court of North Carolina
Gentlemen:
Enclosed herewith I send you a copy of an act passed by the present General
Assembly entitled "An act concerning a Convention of the people." By the first
section of the act, the Governor is required to issue his proclamation commanding
the Sheriffs to open polls and hold an election, &c, &c.
After carefully reading the various provisions of said act and giving to it such
examination as I have been able to bestow, I am forced to the conclusion that it
is in direct conflict with the Constitution of the State, which I have taken a
solemn oath to support, in that it proposes to amend said Constitution in a way
and by a method not recognized nor warranted by the Constitution itself. Enter-
taining this view, I feel that I would be unfaithful to my trust were I in any way,
even at the behest of the General Assembly, to become an instrument to assist
in violating the Supreme law of the State, enacted by the people themselves. I
am willing, however, to surrender my own opinion upon this vital question to the
better opinion of the Supreme Court, which is the final arbiter of all questions
involving the constitutionality of an act of the General Assembly.
I desire not to act rashly or unadvisedly, and therefore most respectfully ask
the opinion of your honorable Court as to the constitutionality of said act; and
whether if unconstitutional, it is my duty as Governor to assist in the execution
thereof, as provided in the first and third sections of said act?





.5 Governor Caldwell to the General Assembly, id. at 65.
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dicament in which he found himself. "I desire," he wrote, "not to act
rashly or unadvisedly and therefore most respectfully ask the opinion
of your honorable Court as to the constitutionality of said act; and
whether, if un-constitutional, it is my duty as Governor to assist" in its
execution.2 Perhaps it was one of Justice Rodman's objections of the
previous year that prompted Caldwell to assure the Court of his willing-
ness to surrender his own opinion "to the better opinion of the Supreme
Court, which is the final arbiter of all questions involving the constitu-
tionality of an act of the General Assembly." Two days later, on
February 11, Chief Justice Pearson, speaking for himself and all his
associates except Reade, expressed "the opinion that the act to which
you refer is in violation of the constitution. * * * Justice Reade, for
the reasons stated by him, when the opinion of the Justices was requested
by the General Assembly in regard to the tenure of office declines to
give an opinion."27
Evidently the attitude of Justice Settle toward advisory opinions
had changed. He had refused advice in the Homestead and Legislative
Tenure cases but gave it here. Justice Rodman's readiness to give an
opinion in this instance can be rationalized with his two earlier refusals
by saying that he may have looked upon this as a "legal" as distinguished
from a "political" question and that the facts made this an occasion of
"the most manifest necessity." Be that as it may: The fact leaps out
that a group of five judges in 1869 had momentarily unanimously
opposed advice giving and now, two years later, were, with one ex-
ception, quite ready to advise.
To the General Assembly Governor Caldwell reported "that as at
present advised, I cannot discharge the duties required of me by said
act." 28 The legislature responded sharply. The convention act was re-
passed2 in such form as to require no administrative action by the gov-
ernor and a devastating joint resolution was adopted censuring the
governor, the chief justice, and certain associate justices for transcending
"the limits of official duty and propriety" and encroaching "upon the
rights, powers and privileges" of the General Assembly in a manner
"subversive of the fundamental principles of the constitution."80  And,
2 See note 24. 27 See note 23.
28 Governors' Letter Books, Tod R. Caldwell, 1870-74, p. 60.
"' N. C. Pub. Laws 1870-71, c. CCXI, 326-332. Ratified, April 3, 1871.
"' Id. at 501-502. The joint resolution follows:
Whereas, The constitution provides that the supreme court shall have juris-
diction to review, upon appeal, any decisions of the courts below upon any matter
of law or legal inference, to issue certain remedial writs, and to hear claims
against the state; and whereas, the powers and duties of the governor are pre-
scribed by the same instrument; and whereas, the constitution further provides
that the "legislative, executive and supreme judicial powers of the government
ought to be forever separate and distinct from each other," and that "all power
of suspending laws or the execution of laws, by any authority, without the consent
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concluded the resolution, "this general assembly doth, in the discharge of
its duty to itself, and in the behalf of the people of North Carolina,
protest against and condemn this usurpation as of evil example and
dangerous tendency."
Judicial tenure opinion.--After this episode twenty-three years
elapsed and a complete change in the Court's membership took place
before another advisory opinion was requested or rendered. And when,
in 1894, a request did come the problem involved was the tenure of
judges. Several judicial vacancies had been filled first by gubernatorial
appointment and then by election in accordance with the provisions of
the Constitution. 3' The question shortly arose whether judges so elected
were entitled to serve full eight-year terms or whether they were limited
to the unexpired portions of the term of the judges whose places they
had taken. As the election of 1894 approached the issue grew critical.
On the one side, Attorney General Osborne took a position favorable to
of the representatives of the people, is injurious to their rights and ought not
to be exercised"; and whereas, the governor has refused to give effect to an act
of this general assembly entitled "an act concerning a convention of the people,"
ratified the eighth day of February, one thousand eight hundred and seventy-one,
and ignoring the attorney general of the state, who by the constitution is made
his legal adviser, has taken the opinion of the chief justice and certain associate
justices of the supreme court as to the validity of said act, without authority of
law, and when no case involving the validity thereof was before the said court, and
now claims that he is sustained in his action by the said opinion; now therefore
this general assembly, in maintenance of its rights and in defense of its privileges
doth resolve,
Sec. 1. That the supreme court hath no other or larger jurisdiction than is
expressly given to it by the constitution.
Sec. 2. That the opinion of the justices of said court, in a case not properly
constituted therein, hath no binding force or effect, and doth not establish the law
in such case.
Sec. 3. That the said chief justice and his associates, in giving said opinion,
have transcended the limits of official duty and propriety, the more especially as
they have a direct interest in the question submitted to them by the executive.
Sec. 4. That the governor of North Carolina has no veto power, nor any
power equivalent thereto, and cannot dispense with laws or suspend the execution
thereof.
Sec. 5. That the governor is not at liberty in his official character to feel
or to affect constitutional scruples, and to sit in judgment himself on the validity
of any act of this general assembly duly ratified, and to nullify it if he so chooses,
but it is his duty to execute such act until it shall have been decided unconstitu-
tional in due course of law.
Sec. 6. That the action of the governor and chief justice and associate jus-
tices of the supreme court in relation to said act, is a manifest encroachment
upon the rights, powers and privileges of this department of the government,
and is subversive of the fundamental principles of the constitution, and this gen-
eral assembly doth, in the discharge of its duty to itself, and in behalf of the
people of North Carolina, protest against and condemn this usurpation as of evil
example and dangerous tendency.
Ratified the 5th day of April, A.D., 1871.
11 N. C. CoNsT., Art. IV, §25: "All vacancies occurring in the offices provided
for by this article . . shall be filled by the appointments of the Governor, unless
otherwise provided for, and the appointees shall hold their places until the next
regular election for members of the General Assembly, when elections shall be
held to fill such offices." The remainder of the section is not pertinent.
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an eight-year term; on the other, "a considerable number of able mem-
bers of the legal profession" supported the narrower view. To resolire
the issue Governor Carr turned to the justices for advice.3 2
It so happened that the tenure of two members of the Supreme
Court was involved in the question, and, because they had a direct in-
terest in the answer, they took no part in the subsequent proceedings
of their colleagues.33 At first the unaffected members, Chief Justice
Shepherd and Associate Justices Avery and Burwell, refrained from
giving advice on grounds of propriety and because the various judges
whose "rights of property" in the offices were involved had not joined
in the governor's request.3 4 Governor Carr succeeded in overcoming
this difficulty by furnishing the justices a suitable request from their
colleagues and from the other judges concerned.3 5 Consequently, on
May 11, 1894, an advisory opinion was rendered. Relying largely upon
legislative construction of the constitutional provision in question, the
three responding justices took the position that the persons elected to
the judgeships in question would hold their offices only for the unex-
pired portions of the terms.36 "It is considered a safe and sound rule
of construction," said the opinion, "that when 'the duration of a term
of office which is filled by popular election is in doubt ... the interpreta-
tion is to be followed which limits it to the shortest time, and returns
to the people at the earliest period the power and authority to refill it.'"
Railroad lease opiion.-Three years after the judicial tenure opin-
ion, the Court became involved in one of the most heated controversies
32114 N. C. 923 (1894). While the normal practice had been that a judge
elected to fill a vacancy held only for the unexpired balance of his predecessor's
term, id. at 926-927, a practice had grown up under Governor Fowle of giving
commissions for full eight-year terms, Justice Walter Clark being one beneficiary
of Fowle's interpretation. A rather full story of the dispute under Governor Carr
may be traced through his papers and letter books. Probably the most informative
single document is an open letter written about. May 22 by George A. Shuford,
one of the Superior Court judges concerned in the tenure question, for publica-
tion in the Asheville Citizen and sent to Governor Carr for review prior to pub-
lication. Governors' Papers, Elias Carr, May-Aug. 1894. The accuracy of Shu-
ford's account was recognized by Governor Carr. Governors' Letter Books, Elias
Carr, April 13-July 4, 1894, p. 369.
" Walter Clark and James C. MacRae, Associate Justices of the Supreme
Court, and Superior Court Judges R. F. Armfield, John Gray Bynum, George A.
Shuford, Spier Whitaker, and E. T. Boykin were the members of the judiciary
whose tenures were immediately at issue. 114 N. C. 924 (1894).
"Ibid.
Copies of Governor Carr's letters requesting the cooperation of the judges
concerned appear in his letter book, and the replies are among his papers. See
note 32. Unlike the others, all of whom expressed their desire for an advisory
opinion in letters to the Governor, Judge Armfield enclosed to Carr a letter dated
April 13, 1894, addressed to the three unaffected members of the Supreme Court
saying that "I desire hereby to join most earnestly with Governor Carr in his
request that the Supreme Court, or such of its members as feel at liberty to do so,
give a construction of said 25th sect. of the 4th article of the constitution. I
believe that this is imperatively demanded by the public interest."2- 114 N. C. 925-929 (1894).
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of the 1890's. The partially state-owned North Carolina Railroad had
been leased in 1871 to the Richmond and Danville Railroad for a period
of 30 years. The latter road became a part of the newly organized
Southern Railway Company in 1894 and, in 1895, Governor Carr took
the lead in causing a renewal of the lease for a 99-year period, with the
Southern as lessee 37 That this action should have stimulated a violent
political reaction is hardly surprising; certainly it played a part in mak-
ing possible the Republican-Populist fusion victory in 1896. The new
governor, Daniel L. Russell, attacked the lease in his inaugural38 and
the legislature began an effort to cancel or modify it. The House of
Representatives adopted a bill directing that action be taken to annul
the lease. In the Senate, however, friends of the railroad succeeded in
passing a substitute measure which proposed a reduction of the life of
the lease to 36 years and required the Southern to deliver an appropriate
instrument agreeing to the reduction. The lease thus modified was then
to be approved by the Board of Directors of the North Carolina Rail-
road.3 9 When the Senate substitute was brought to the House, question
arose whether the bill, if passed and ratified, could become operative
"before its ratification by the stockholders" of the latter road. The
special committee charged with the lease problem desired to secure
judicial advice on this point and a struggle ensued. During the debate,
Representative Cook, the committee chairman, demanded to know how,
"if the House refuses to allow a ruling by the Supreme Court, ... the
committee [could be expected to] report that which involves the gravest
constitutional question, and say to this House, [that] this [Senate] bill
is the best thing.' 40  And Representative Lusk argued that "the com-
mittee, uncertain as to its duty, could do nothing else than want leave to
have the question referred to the Supreme Court so the latter could say
whether the bill should be reported to the House."41  Representative
'3 Governor Carr in his final message to the legislature invited investigation,
saying: "I favored the lease ... and it was done by the Board of Directors with
my full concurrence and endorsed by the stockholders without a dissenting vote. I
believed and still believe, it is the best thing that could have been done by the
State, and the future will determine the wisdom of the transaction." N. C. PUBLIC
DOCUMENTS, Session 1897, Doc. No. 1, p. 18. See also, HAMILTON, HISTORY OF
NORTH CAROLINA SINCE 1860, 254, 268-269 (1919).
" Governor Russell declared: "The lease for ninety-nine years of all the rights,
franchises, and property . . . of this railroad to a foreign non-resident corporation
was made without the sanction of the Legislature or of the people ... at a time
when nobody expected it . . . within a few months of the adjournment of our
General Assembly . . . without due discussion or submission to the people . . . six
years before the existing lease expired . . . substantially by one man . . . the
Governor of the State . . . without inviting competition among the [possible]
bidders . . . under circumstances that indicate intentional secrecy. It was called
a lease. It was, in reality, an attempted sale." N. C. PUBLIC DOCUMENTS, Ses-
sion 1897, No. A, Russell Inaugural, 8-9.
" In the matter of Leasing the North Carolina Railroad, 120 N. C. 623 (1897).
40 Raleigh News and Observer, March 6, 1897.
41 Ibid.
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Walter Murphy, however, declared that "the Supreme Court had no
business in this matter, save to construe a law after its enactment; that
there are three coordinate branches of the government, each in its own
place. * * * Who [he asked] would be bound by a horse-back opinion
of the Supreme Court ?-142 But the opposition of Murphy and his pro-
lease colleagues proved futile, for the House, by a narrow margin, voted
to ask an advisory opinion.
Doubt expressed during the debate that an advisory opinion would
be rendered proved groundless, for the justices responded with celerity
over the signature of Chief Justice Faircloth.43  If the power to lease
the railroad was vested in the company-and on this point the justices
intimated no opinion either way-the stockholders, not the directors,
possessed that power, the House was informed. The proposed bill,
therefore, "would be an amendment of the charter transferring power
from the stockholders, and [would be] invalid unless accepted by the
stockholders in general or special meeting assembled." Faced by this
view of the proposal, the House dropped the subject and the session
adjourned without final action, thus leaving the whole problem in Gov-
ernor Russell's ample lap.44
Advisory opinions under Chief Justices Clark and Hoke.-Following
the railroad lease opinion there occurred another long period during
which the advisory function was dormant. Then beginning in 1917
came a series of opinions relating to constitutional limitations on special
or local legislation and to problems concerning the judiciary. It is in-
teresting that none of this series of opinions except that of 1929 was
published in the North Carolina Reports until 1948 and indeed that they
were wholly lost sight of until the present writer unearthed them. More
important, however, is the fact that every request made during this
period from 1917 to 1929 inclusive asked the opinion of the Supreme
Court rather than the opinions of its members. And the justices re-
sponded as a Court in the first two instances; in the other instances,
the replies came as from individual justices and finally, in 1929, the
justices took the position that they could not give advice as a Court.
In 1916 three constitutional amendments limiting special, private,
and local legislation were approved by the voters.45 The 1917 General
Assembly found itself faced, partly as a result of these amendments,
with a number of comprehensive legislative problems among which was
"2Ibid. Representative Murphy also remarked that "it made no difference
what the Supreme Court said; that the reference to that court was wrong, when
this very court might be called on to pass upon this very question. He said the
court had never before passed upon such a matter as this."
13120 N. C. 433-434 (1897).
" Governor Russell ultimately confirmed the lease. HAMILTON, op. Cit. supra
note 37, at 269.
"1 N. C. MANUAI 1917, p. 294.
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the adoption of general laws relative to municipal government and
finance. While preparing the municipal government act, the legislature
encountered the question whether any provision in the new amendments
"would require the General Assembly to provide by general law the
machinery for annexation by cities and towns of outlying and adjacent
territory ;, or whether ... the General Assembly could make these an-
nexations by special act, as the circumstances of each city or town
might... require." This problem was, by a joint resolution originating
in the Senate, referred to the Supreme Court for advice "as to the
court's interpretation. . . ."46 On the very day of the request, Chief
Justice Walter Clark replied that because of "the public importance of
the matter the Supreme Court has decided to respond. . . . After due
consideration the Court is unanimously of opinion that the [1916]
amendments do not take from the General Assembly jurisdiction and
power to enact special laws relating to annexation by a city or town of
adjacent territory. 4 7 Presumably this interpretation satisfied the legis-
lature for the general municipal government act subsequently passed
contained no provisions on annexation.
One of the 1916 amendments specifically prohibited local, special, or
private acts or resolutions relating to the appointment of justices of the
peace, and, in the 1919 General Assembly, the question arose whether
the legislature was thereby barred from enacting the usual omnibus
justice of the peace bill. Again by a joint resolution originating in the
Senate, the Supreme Court's opinion was asked and promptly gotten.48
"The Court," wrote Chief Justice Clark, "has conferred together . . .
and are of the opinion that, the [omnibus] bill is constitutional and not
in contravention of the recent amendment." Thus fortified by the
Court's opinion, the Senate gave its approval to the bill and it became
law.4
9
In the next advisory opinion, the Senate, which made the request,
got what it asked and more to boot.50 The Municipal Finance Act
passed at the regular session of 1921 had been declared unconstitutional
by the Supreme Court,51 and, in December, a special session called by
Governor Morrison undertook to revise the law and make it constitu-
"8I. C. Pub. Laws 1917, p. 627; In re Municipal Annexations, 227 N. C. 716
(1917). Italics mine.
'
T SENATE JOURNAL, 1917, p. 427; 227 N. C. 716-717. The joint resolution was
ratified on Feb. 26, 1917, and the advisory opinion was rendered on the same day.
Italics mine.
,' N. C. Pub. Laws 1919, p. 576; SENATE JOURNAL, 1919, p. 327; 227 N. C. 717
(1919). . The request was ratified on Feb. 26 and the opinion was rendered on
Feb. 27.
" N. C. Pub. Laws 1919, c. 99, pp. 255-272, ratified March 11.
" Resolution of request, Dec. 15, 1921, SENATE JouRNAT,, Extra Session 1921,
op. 152, 252; opinions in response, Dec. 15, id. 173; 227 N. C. 718-719 (1921).
"Allen et al. v. City of Raleigh, 181 N. C. 453, 107 S. E. 463 (1921).
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tioplal and effective. 'As passed by the House, the revised act exempted
the incorporated towns of Madison County from its operation. Doubt
arose .whether such exemption would invalidate the act under the relevant
special legislation restrictions and the matter was "most respectfully"
referred for "an expression of opinion from the Supreme Court." Four
of the justices, including Associate Justice Walter P. Stacy, replied that
"the mere omission of Madison County from certain provisions will
not itself invalidate the act, if properly passed by both Houses ... ,,2
Chief Justice Clark, however, disregarded the question raised by the
Senate and gave the Senate advice upon another question. 3 "It ap-
peared to us [the justices] in conference with the committee of the
Senate that said bill was materially amended on its passage through the
House. .. . ." Under this circumstance, if the leading case, Glenn v.
Wray, were to be followed, "it would be necessary that the amended
bill should be read over again three times in each House, with a yea
and nay vote on the second and third readings entered on the journal.
It is the bill in its final shape, not in another and different form, which
requires these preliminaries to its validity," wrote the Chief Justice. He
explained his action in going beyond the formal limits of the Senate's
request for advice by saying that he understood "that the object of your
[the Senate's] resolution was to ascertain the constitutionality of the
pending bill should it pass, in its present shape, the second and third
readings in your body. Candor compels me to say ... that the bill as
passed by you under present circumstances, would be unconstitutional,
and the bonds issued thereunder void, unless all previous decisions ...
are to be overruled.. .. This renders it unnecessary for me to express
any opinion on any mere detail in the bill."
What the Chief justice volunteered was quickly heeded by the
House, which recalled the bill from the Senate and put it through the
formal stages with celerity. 54 No one will deny that Clark's opinion
probably saved the state another legislative fiasco, but the question may,
nevertheless, be raised-as it was indeed by Justice Reade in 187Orl-
whether, as a matter of propriety, courtesy, or punctilio, the judges
should venture their advice upon questions not put to them.
When the 1921 opinion was rendered, the United States was already
launched upon "a great social and economic experiment, noble in motive
and far-reaching in purpose," and, by 1925, the judiciaries of the states
generally, and of North Carolina in particular, found themselves faced
with congested dockets due in part to prohibition. Various proposals
designed to alleviate this condition were considered by the General
" 227 N. C. 719 (1921). " Ibid.
4 N. C. HOUSE JOURNAL, Extra Session 1921, pp. 274-275.
r 64 N. C. 793 (1870).
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Assembly of 1925. Circuit judgeships, emergency judgeships, additional
judicial and solicitorial districts, and various other palliatives were sug-
gested, but in view of the language of the Constitution grave, doubts
arose as to legality of these devices. On January 31, 1925, therefore,
the General Assembly decided to shift the burden of separating consti-
tutional from unconstitutional proposals to the "honorable, the Supreme
Court," which was asked, in an omnibus resolution, to construe Article
IV, sections 10 and 11 of the Constitution, in their bearing upon six
different points and also to pass upon the constitutionality of four
bills.5" This amazing example of legislative buck-passing was accorded
no formal response by the Court. Instead, if press accounts are to be
credited, a conference was held between the justices and members of
the committees of the two houses, and an "informal ruling" or an
"informal oral opinion" was given to the effect that a proposed circuit
judgeship plan was unconstitutional.57  In all probability the justices
objected to answering any such galaxy of queries as the joint resolution
put to them, and there is strong evidence that the request was with-
drawn by the committees.-5
With circuit judgeships out of the question, both houses turned to
other expedients, and, in the Senate, a bill was brought forward to
authorize gubernatorial appointment of emergency judges to help reduce
crowded dockets in the Superior Courts. Senator Dunlap, the introducer
of this bill, simultaneously obtained approval of a resolution calling
attention to confusion that had arisen 'among legislators about, the
"meaning of the verbal opinion of the ... Supreme Court ... recently
given upon a questionnaire presented to it," and requesting the Court's
opinion on the constitutionality of his bill.59 The opinion, rendered
three days later, treated the request as though addressed to the judges
as individuals rather than as a court and all justices signed the reply:
"[WE] beg to say that after due consideration, and as now advised, we
are unable to discover any constitutional inhibition to the provisions of
said bill. We therefore give it as our opinion that if said bill should
become a law, it would be constitutional." 60 A few days later the Dun-
lap bill had passed both houses of the General Assembly without amend-
ment and was duly ratified and enrolled.6 '
The Court denies aduice, 1929.-The Court was not yet through
with legislative problems concerning the Superior Courts, for the 1929
N' . C. Pub. Laws 1925, Resolution No. 20; 227 N. C. 721-723 (1925).
Raleigh News and Observer, Feb. 7, 1925; see also N. C. SENATE JoURNAL,
1925, p. 632; 227 N. C 720 (1925).
196 N. C. 828, 829 (1929).
' Resolution of request, Feb. 14, 1925, N. C. SENATE JouRNAL, 1925, pp. 631-
632; opinion, Feb. 17, id. at 205-206; 227 N. C. 720-721 (1925).
.
0Ibid. " N. C. Pub. Laws 1925, c. 216.
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Senate submitted to the Supreme Court two bills concerning the admin-
istration of justice in Mecklenburg County and the Fourteenth Judicial
District together with a resolution respectfully requesting "the Supreme
Court of North Carolina ... to inspect said bills and advise the Senate
.. whether in the opinion of the Court, said bills are in contravention
of the Constitution. '62
The Court, which had now come under the leadership of Chief Jus-
tice Stacy, apparently decided that the time had arrived to clarify its
relationship to the advisory function and to introduce some regularity
into the exercise of that function. Hence the Court returned the bills
to the Senate without passing on their constitutionality, 3 and, speaking
through the Chief Justice, made the following statement:
"It has long been a mooted question, and one not easy of
decision, as to whether the Constitution of 1868 does, or does
not, prohibit the Supreme Court from giving advisory opinions.
When the matter first arose in 1870 . . .Justices Reade and
Settle took the position that it does, while Chief Justice Pearson
and Jvstices Rodman and Dick were of the opinion that the mem-
bers of the Court, as Justices, but not as a Court, might give
such opinions to the General Assembly simply as a matter of
courtesy, and out of respect, to a coordinate branch of the gov-
ernment. The present resolution, it will be observed, is addressed
to the Court in its official capacity."'64
The Court recognized that advisory opinions had previously been fur-
nished "on constitutional questions, affecting the structure of the gov-
ernment and matters of grave public moment, when it appeared, with
reasonable certainty, that a course of action had been agreed upon by
the General Assembly" as the one to be taken if not contrary to the
organic law. "This is as far as our predecessors have gone, and we
do not feel at liberty to extend the precedents established by them, in
the absence of a more urgent showing." If the General Assembly
should settle upon its course of action and bring the matter "within the
limits above stated, the members of the Court would not then hesitate
to express their opinions." 65
Some out-of-state writers, unaware of subsequent developments, con-
cluded that the 1929 refusal marked the end of advisory opinions in
North Carolina. 6  Nothing could be less true. What the refusal did
achieve was a regularization of practice. Not once since that year has
a request been addressed to the Court; instead, the Chief Justice and
Associate Justices are asked for their opinions. Nor has the General
Assembly sought advice unless its course was so clearly determined that
" In the Matter of Advisory Opinions, 196 N. C. 828 (1929).
Id. at 829. 0 4Ibid.
* Ibid. ,' See note 1 supra.
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only the approval of the justices was necessary for action to be taken.
Repeal Election and the Proposed New State Constitution, 1933-
1934.-After the Court's refusal in 1929 to advise the legislature as a
court, no further request was made upon- the justices until 1933. The
General Assembly of 1933 on May 8 approved for submission to the
electorate a new state constitution; on the following day, it provided
that an election should be held in November to decide whether a con-
stitutional convention should be called to act on the pending Twenty-
First, or Prohibition Repeal, Amendment to the Federal Constitution.6 7
The second of these actions the legislature had taken only after the
justices had twice been called upon to help resolve differences of opin-
ion between the houses: The Constitution of North Carolina provides
that "No convention of the people... shall ever be called by the General
Assembly, unless by the concurrence of two-thirds of all the members
of each House ... and except the proposition, Convention or NO Con-
vention, be first submitted to the qualified voters ... at the next general
election. ... 68 Should this provision control legislative action in
calling a convention to act on an amendment to the United States Con-
stitution? The Senate Committee on Constitutional Amendments thought
it should and reported the McLean bill designed to follow the procedure
outlined in the State Constitution; the corresponding House Committee
thought otherwise and reported the Murphy bill calling a repeal con-
vention and directing the choice of delegates at a special election to be
held in November 1933. An agreement was reached to submit the two
bills to the justices of the Supreme Court and ask them to advise the
General Assembly whether "said bills, either or both of them, set up
the constitutional procedure" for calling the necessary convention. 69 The
legislature assured the justices that it intended to pass one or the other
of the bills if it could do so constitutionally; thus the reference was
brought well within the 1929 limitations.
The justices replied "as individuals" on April 5, a week having
elapsed since the reference of the question.7" None of them doubted
the complete constitutionality of the Senate bill; but there was differ-
ence of opinion about the House bill, "the majority being of the opinion
that such a convention [as it provided in disregard of the State Con-
stitution] would not be valid for any purpose, the minority being of a
contrary opinion."
N . C. Pub. Laws 1933, c. 383 and 403.
Art. XIII, §1. Italics mine.
"Resolution of request and summary of McLean and Murphy bills, 204 N. C.
806-808 (1933).
" Id. at 808-809. Discussion of the matter went on for several days in the
newspapers, e.g., Raleigh News and Observer, March 28, April 6 and 7, 1933,
which expressed the view, among other things, that the election must take place
in Nov. 1934.
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From this opinion the press and the legislature concluded that the
course of wisdom would be to follow the State Constitution, and the
.committees acting jointly therefore agreed to modify the Murphy bill by
.calling for a simultaneous vote on the question "convention or no con-
vention" and on the election of delegates. The election, following the
original Murphy bill, was to be held in November 1933, a year before
the regular time for a statewide election, but was to be termed "general"
instead of "special." Because some members believed that the legis-
lature was exceeding its authority in describing as "general" an election
held for a single purpose at an unusual time, an advisory opinion was
asked concerning the constitutionality of the revised bill.71
After a lapse of nearly two weeks, the desired advice was received.
justices Adams and Connor held that the revised Murphy bill was con-
stitutional and that a convention thus called and elected would be author-
ized to act on prohibition repeal.7 2 With this position, Chief Justice
Stacy did not disagree, but, in a carefully written opinion, he took the
view that the provisions of Article XIII of the State Constitution need
not be followed when the amendment of the National Constitution was
involved.
"It is my opinion [wrote the Chief Justice] that the General
Assembly * * * may exercise its own judgment and provide for
the submission of the question under . . . Article XIII of the
State Constitution, or it may call such convention in exercise of
its plenary powers without regard to ... said section. It follows,
therefore, . . . that it can make no difference, so far as the con-
stitutionality of the present bill is concerned, whether the election
be designated a general or a special one."' 73
Justice Brogden, although he agreed with the Chief Justice that
Article XIII of the State Constitution was not necessarily activated by
a proposal to amend the Federal Constitution, nevertheless wrote an
elaborate dictum on the presumption that Article XIII was applicable. 74
To him, therefore, the question whether the proposed election was a
general election became important. Realistically and with adequate prec-
edent, he declared that an election held "throughout the entire State,
called and conducted in accordance with legislative fiat" was "general."
Associate Justice Clarkson thought otherwise. The revised Murphy
bill was, in his opinion "practically the same" as its predecessor except
for its "calling a special election 'for the sole and exclusive purpose,' a
general election." To Justice Clarkson the next general election was
"well understood to be the general election in November, 1934."' 7r
"' Resolution of request and summary of bill, 204 N. C. 809-811 (1933).
72Id. at 815, 816-817. 73Id. at 811-814.
74 Id. at 817. " Id. at 815.
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Thus supported by all members of the Court except Justice Clarkson,
the General Assembly proceeded -to enact the Murphy bill, and, subse-
quently the voters of North Carolina elected dry delegates to a repeal
convention which they simultaneously voted should not be held.7" The
student familiar with constitutional law cannot but be somewhat amazed
that any of the Court should have believed that the legislature must abide
by Article XIII of the State Constitution when exercising power derived
from the United States Constitution. The opinion of the Chief Justice
was thoroughly sound on this point; Justice Brogden would have done
well had he omitted his discussion of Article XIII and the term "gen-
eral elections." The justices probably did not foresee, as they wrote
their opinions in April 1933, that they were setting a booby-trap for
the new State Constitution, which was even then making its way through
the General Assembly.
In the year following the repeal election, while the nation as a whole
was writing finis after the "noble experiment" of prohibition, the battle
over the pending State Constitution took form. Although ably led, the
supporters of change faced an uphill fight. The new basic law had
been proposed as a unit, a fact that enabled the opposition to combine
into one camp those who disliked different parts. Consequently, as fall
approached, indications pointed to defeat of the proposed change unless
a way out could be found .
7
At this juncture, the ghost of the repeal election appeared. Amend-
ments to the State Constitution were, in the language of Article XIII,
"to be submitted at the next general election" after their proposal by
the General Assembly. Someone now-it was September 1934-raised
the question whether the "next general election" had not been that held
" The vote on the convention question was 120,190 for to 293,484 against; on
the delegates the vote was 115,482 for those favoring repeal to 300,054 for those
opposing repeal. N. C. MANUAL 233 (1947).
So far as the writer has traced the prophecies of the press, it appears that
opinion was running strongly against ratification of the new constitution. R. A.
Doughton, chairman, and Banks Arendell, executive secretary, of the organization
opposing ratification declared in a joint statement that "it is generally agreed that
the proposed new constitution would have been overwhelmingly defeated." Raleigh
News and Observer, Sept. 30, 1934. It is difficult to explain the aggressive effort
of the friends of the new constitution to secure an advisory opinion unless they
saw in it a means of salvaging some of their handiwork from impending catas-
trophe. Nevertheless, in all fairness to another point of view, the following
question put by the writer to Mr. Kemp D. Battle and his reply thereto must be
quoted: Question: "Is it true that the leading supporters of the proposed con-
stitution foresaw its outright defeat at the polls and therefore desired an advisory
opinion, holding that the 'next general election' after the 1933 General Assembly
had been the year-past 'repeal election'?" Answer: "I would answer this in the
negative. The revised constitution had encountered much more opposition than
was anticipated in view of the eminence of the commission which had prepared
it and in view of its bi-partisan support. Whether its defeat was foreseen doubt-
less varied from individual to individual, but its ultimate adoption still seemed a
reasonable expectation." Correspondence with Mr. Battle, July 16 and 21, 1947.
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in November 1933. "It does look as if some of us may have gone to
considerable unnecessary trouble," ruefully observed Revenue Commis-
sioner A. J. Maxwell, a framer and strong supporter of the new Con-
stitution, "it is a grave question."7 8 At the instance of Kemp D. Battle,
chairman of the Committee for the Proposed New Constitution, a con-
ference was held on or about September 14 at which Governor Ehring-
haus, Attorney General Brummitt, Assistant Attorney General [now
Justice] A. A. F. Seawell, and Mr. Battle were present. Presumably
various alternative courses were discussed and the decision was reached
to seek the advice of the Supreme Court.79
Governor Ehringhaus accordingly addressed a letter to the justices
asking that, "if it be in keeping with the proprieties and functions of
the Court," they advise him whether the forthcoming election or the
over-and-gone repeal election was the "next general election" within the
meaning of Article XIII. With such advice at hand, the governor
would "be able to . . . direct the Chairman of the Board of Elections
and other election officials in accordance with sound law."
80
The Supreme Court at this moment included two of the Commission
that had drafted the proposed Constitution, so that document had friends
in court.81 They, along with two of their brethren, in two short sen-
tences ruled that the 1933 repeal election had been held under Article
XIII of the State Constitution and was therefore the next general elec-
tion after the General Assembly of 1933.82 Even Justice Clarkson
accepted this view. He had, he noted in a separate reply, taken the
position in 1933 "that calling a 'special election' a 'general election'
did not make it so," but "the majority decided otherwise" and "the
majority opinion of this Court [in the 1933 case] I consider a mandate
binding on me."8 3
Announcement of these views led to the immediate abandonment of
the planned election; hence North Carolinians never got an opportunity
to ballot on the proposed Constitution. Neither the supporters of
change nor its opponents revealed any deep disappointment at this
result.
"Raleigh News and Observer, Sept. 19, 1934. Just when doubt was first cast
on the legality of the 1934 election is a question of some interest. A story in the
Raleigh News and Observer, Sept. 21, 1934, states that a North Carolina attorney
had brought the matter to the attention of Governor Ehringhaus in September
1933. Governor Ehringhaus, in an interview in July 1947 told the writer he could
remember no such communication, though it was not impossible that there had
been one. Mr. Battle, in the correspondence cited above, states that the question
was new to him in September 1934.
" Raleigh News and Observer, Sept. 18, 1934. The news account states that
"members of the Supreme Court" were present at the conference. I have been
unable to determine whether this statement is true.80207 N. C. 879 (1935).
S: Chief Justice Stacy and Associate Justice Michael Schenck.
82207 N. C. 880 (1935). 83Ibid.
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What of the intrinsic merit of the opinions? If the alleged pur-
pose-saving the proposed Constitution from defeat at the polls-justi-
fies the means, the decisive share of the justices in cancelling the election
may find approval; if, however, the means itself must stand analysis,
approval becomes more difficult. Did the justices give adequate con-
sideration to the problem before them? Perhaps not. If the repeal
election was the first general election held in North. Carolina after the
adjournment of the 1933 General Assembly, it was also the first after
that of November 8, 1932. Presumably, then, the proposed Constitution
should have been submitted to the voters at the repeal election; pre-
sumably also elective state offices vacated by death more than thirty days
before the repeal election should have been filled at that election. 84
Therefore the voters in November 1933 should have voted on at least
two state-wide matters in addition to repeal: the proposed Constitution
and the state treasurership-then and for a year thereafter filled by
Charles M. Johnson under executive appointment dated November 17,
1932.8r Why, in view of these facts, were these matters not submitted
to the voters in 1933? The answer is simple. The repeal election act
specifically stated that the election was for the "sole and exclusive pur-
pose" of passing on the convention question and choosing delegates
thereto and that "it shall not be competent or lawful to elect any officers
of the State or local governments, or to vote or pass on any other
proposition at said election."8 6
Everyone had assumed that the regular election of 1934 was the
proper one for the Constitution vote, and, by discountenancing this
assumption, the advisory opinion created the following absurd state of
facts: The Constitution vote could not be held in 1934 because the
repeal election of the previous year had been the next general election.
The act providing for that election prohibited any vote on the Constitu-
tion. Therefore there never was a lawful time to vote on the new Con-
stitution. This interpretation, however, raises the question whether
North Carolina had a de jure state treasurer from November 1933 to
November 1934, when, interestingly enough, a state treasurer was
elected to fill out the unexpired term.8 7
These constitutional absurdities would have been avoided had the
justices-even as late as 1934--taken the view that the passage of the
", If the office of any of the state executive officers mentioned in N. C. CoNsT.,
Art. III, §13, is vacated before the expiration of the term, the governor fills the
vacancy temporarily by appointment. "Every such vacancy shall be filled by
election at the first general election that occurs more than thirty days after the
vacancy has taken place, and the person chosen shall hold office for the remainder
of the unexpired term. ...68N. C. MANUAL 349 (1947). 8' N. C. Pub. Laws 1933, c. 403.
See Raleigh Nevs and Observer, Sept. 21, 1934, for a discussion of this
question.
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repeal election act was an exercise by the General Assembly of 'Power
derived from Article V of the United States Constitution. If they had
done this, they might have said of the 1933 election, as Justice Clarkson
actually did say, that "calling a 'special election' a 'general election' did
not make it so." The ghost of the second 1933 advisory opinion had
slain the proposed Constitution before the voters got their chance to
knife it. Page Mr. Justice Frankfurter!
Yelton and Phillips opinions, 1944-1946.-Nearly a decade passed
before another advisory opinion was rendered and then in the brief
space of three and a half years four requests brought replies. The first
two involved leaves of absence to state officers desiring to enter the
service of the United States. The Constitution of North Carolina, Art.
XIV, sec. 7, provides as follows:
"No person who shall hold any office or place of trust or
profit under the United States, or any department thereof, or
under this State, or under any other state or government, shall
hold or exercise any other office or place of trust or profit under
the authority of this State, or be eligible to a seat in either house
of the General Assembly: Provided, that nothing herein contained
shall extend to officers in the militia, notaries public, justices of
the peace, commissioners of public charities, or commissioners for
special purposes."
Nathan Yelton, Comptroller of the State Board of Education,
accepted a commission as captain in the United States Army, was
assigned for work with the Allied Military Governments, and entered
upon his duties on December 27, 1943. He applied to Governor
Broughton for a leave of absence under the provisions of Chapter 121,
Public Laws of 1941, and the governor, upon the advice of Attorney
General McMullan, asked the opinion of the justices concerning his
legal right to grant the requested leave.88
In their unanimous reply, the justices recognized the broad signif-
icance of the case as bearing upon leave-granting for all state officials
who might desire to accept commissions in the armed forces of the
United States. The right of the governor to grant the leave was recog-
nized. There would, the opinion pointed out, be no question at all
were Yelton entering the service as a private.89 Nor would the accept-
ance of the captaincy create the forbidden status of double-office hold-
ing. Relying on a series of North Carolina cases, the justices declared
that "where the second office is temporary, or the appointment thereto
8 In re Yelton: Advisory Opinion, 223 N. C. 845, 28 S. E. 2d 567 (1944);
letter of request, id. at 846-848, 28 S. E. 2d at 568-569; attorney general's letter,
id. at 848-849, 28 S. E. 2d at 569; opinion of the justices, id. at 849-853, 28 S. E.
2d at 569-572.8oId. at 850, 28 S. E. 2d at 570.
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does not 'require continuous public service,' no constitutional offence
is . . . incurred. * * * Such would seem to be the case here."90  The
temporary character of Yelton's relationship to the Army, the justices
stated, saved the case from the rule relative to the incompatibility 'of
offices, which had existed in the Martin case, supra, and which might
have existed here "if the services contemplated were those of the pro-
fessional, permanent soldier, as distinguished from those of the tem-
porary citizen-soldier."91
The justices put much stress on the exception granted militia
officers in the constitutional provision quoted above. They admitted
that this designation might not apply literally to Yelton, but they
deemed it to apply in spirit. "If need be, the letter gives way to pro-
mote the equity of the spirit."92  The aim of the prohibition upon
double-office holding was to prevent the simultaneous active performance
of, and the simultaneous taking of compensation for, two offices. The
facts being as they were, the justices stated, to allow a militia officer
and bar a temporary army officer the benefit of the proviso "would be
to say that an unwarranted discrimination inheres in the Constitution,-
whereas the pervading principle of the organic law is equality of treat-
ment." 93 That numerous out-of-state cases could be cited to sustain or
to deny their conclusion in Yelton's case, the justices frankly admitted,
but, they said, "in its final analysis, we are left to apply our own Con-
stitution to the facts in hand, and to say what it means. The authorities
elsewhere, while enlightening, are not controlling." 94 With this opinion
at hand, the Governor granted Yelton leave.
The Yelton case was settled early in 1944; the war was fought out
to complete military victory; the problem of war-crimes trials became a
matter of grave concern to the victorious powers. The War Depart-
ment in recruiting qualified jurists, sought the services of Superior Court
Judge F. Donald Phillips of the Thirteenth Judicial District, and Judge
Phillips asked a leave of absence for a period not to exceed one year.9"5
Attorney General McMullan believed that leave might properly be
granted and that Judge Phillips might then accept the tendered judge-
ship of a United States Zonal Court in Germany without vacating his
Superior Court post. Nevertheless the attorney general deemed the
question sufficiently open to doubt to make desirable an advisory opinion.
"This question is important to Judge Phillips but also important to the
" Id. at 851, 28 S. E. 2d at 570. 9 Id. at 852, 28 S. E. 2d at 571.
9- Id. at 851, 28 S. E. 2d at 571. 93 Id. at 852, 28 S. E. 2d at 571.
"Id. at 852-853, 28 S. E. 2d at 571.
"Advisory Opinion it; re F. Donald Phillips, 226 N. C. 772, 39 S. E. 2d 217(1946) ; letter of request, id. at 772-774, 39 S. E. 2d at 217-9; attorney general's
letter, id. at 774-775, 39 S. E. 2d at 219; letter of Acting Secretary of War Ken-
neth Royall, id. at 776, 39 S. E. 2d at 220; advisory opinion, id. at 776-778, 39
S. E. 2d at 220-221.
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public, as it will be necessary to know whether . . . any person ..
appointed to fill the vacancy while he is on leave . .. would in all re-
spects be authorized and empowered to act as the Judge of the Superior
Court,"
9 6
Governor Cherry therefore asked the justices' opinion on a series of
questions, only one of which was answered. "The principal inquiry,"
wrote the members of the Court, "is whether Judge Phillips would
vacate his present office, if, during his absence, he should accept" the
war-crimes post.97 After reviewing briefly the Yelton opinion, the
justices pointed out that the office offered Judge Phillips "carries with
it some of the attributes of sovereignty" and would "invest him with
goyernmental authority.""" He would therefore hold "an office or place
of trust or profit under the United States," or a department thereof. 99
The request for leave, it was true was limited to a year or less, but the
court over which Judge Phillips would preside was not so limited. A
state officer who assumes a second forbidden or incompatible office
vacates the first.'0 0 All of this would seem to lead to the conclusion
that Judge Phillips could not accept a war-crimes judgeship without
vacating his North Carolina post, but the advisory opinion avoids say-
ing so point-blank. Instead Governor Cherry was "advised that the
pivotal question . . . is regarded as involved in too much doubt to
warrant a negative response or one favorable to the purposes indicated
and contemplated."' 0' The answer was of course interpreted by all
concerned as negativing the leave plan, and Judge Phillips, after a con-
ference with the Governor, decided to resign.10 2
Expense allowances for legislators, 1947.-The members of the
Supreme Court, in March 1947, were confronted with the most unpleas-
ant task of denying to members of the General Assembly that measure
of financial relief to which a majority of the legislators deemed them-
selves justly entitled. A salary of $600 without supplement for expenses
has long demanded undue sacrifice of Senators and Representatives,
but a contsitutional amendment designed to give relief by granting legis-
lators an allowance of $10 a day for a 60-day period was narrowly
defeated at the polls in 1-946.103 The 1947 General Assembly, undis-
couraged, proposed a new amendment for action at the general election
9 1 Id. at 775, 39 S. E. 2d at 219. 97 Id. at 776-777, 39 S. E. 2d at 220.
9. Id. at 777, 39 S. E. 2d at 220. 0 Ibid.
:LOIbid. 01 Id. at 778, 39 S. E. 2d at 221.
'02 Raleigh News and Observer, Sept. 8, 1946. Judge Phillips was "frankly
surprised by the Supreme Court's opinion." Id. Sept. 18, 1946. W. G. Pittman
was appointed to the vacancy created; upon Judge Phillips' return from Germany,
Judge Pittman resigned and Judge Phillips replaced him on Nov. 10, 1947, and,
on Nov. 2, 1948, was elected to fill out the remaining portion of the term for
which he was originally chosen in 1942.
0 "'The vote was 143,021 for to 143,918 against the amendment. N. C. MANUAL
230-232 (1947).
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of 1948 and,'being reluctant to await the outcome thereof, was on the
verge of voting itself the same subsistence and travel allowances paid
state official,4 and employees when away from home on official, busi-
ness.*0 4 Serious constitutional doubts existed, however, concerning the
General Assembly's authority so to act, and, consequently, after Attorney
General McMullan declined to give a positive answer, the constitutional
question was referred by joint resolution to the justices. 10 5
In a unanimous advisory opinion, the legislature was informed that
it "would seem to be without authority" to grant itself the proposed
allowances. 0 6 Casting a glance back toward the 1946 action of the
voters, the justices declared "the voice of the people" to be "the voice
of finality." The people, the justices pointed out, had authorized the
legislature to set the compensation of other state employees but had
reserved to themselves the right to set the compensation of legislators.
This they did, said the opinion, in order to relieve law-makers of "the
necessity of passing upon a matter in which they have a direct pecuniary
interest." Upon the receipt of this opinion, the General Assembly
abandoned the pending legislation and the hope of relief was deferred
until the 1948 election.
0 °0
. The missing enacting clause opinion, 1947.-More important to
North Carolinians than its predecessor was the advisory opinion pro-
nouncing void the comprehensive revision of the state's adoption laws
made by the 1947 General Assembly. The purported legislation, intro-
duced as House Bill No. 65, was revised in various particulars in
,Judiciary Committee No. 2, and a substitute bill was reported favorably
by that committee. This substitute passed all remaining stages in the
House, all stages in the Senate, was enrolled, and was ratified. At no
point during this process was it discovered that the substitute con-
tained no enacting clause. The magic words "The General Assembly
of North Carolina do enact" were missing from the bill. 0 7
0 ,$6 a day. Raleigh News and Observer, March 26, 1947.
""
0 Attorney General McMullan, by statute made legal adviser to the General
Assembly, post. p. 336, suggested that the matter be referred to the justices. "If
I c6uld furnish a definite opinion," the attorney general wrote, "I would not
hesitate to do so, but as this question and no question very similar to it has ever
been presented to our Supreme Court, it would be impossible for me to forecast
with certainty what the decision would be if the question were presented." The
attorney general added that, while he was not in a position to give an opinion,
he believed the expense allowance proposed to be unconstitutional. Raleigh News
and Observer, March 26, 1947.-
"'Matter of Legislative Subsistence and Travel Allowance, 227 N. C. 705(1947). Resolution of request, id- at 705-706 (also N. C. Laws 1947, p. 1684);
opinion, id. at 706-707.
... The proposed amendment increasing the pay of legislators to $1,200 met
defeat at the general election held on November 2, 1948, the vote being 235,535
for ratification to 248,786 against.
N. C. CONST., Art. II, §21. An Act to Rewrite Chapter 48 of the General
Statutes Relating to Adoptions, N. C. Laws 1947, c. 885. See 227 N. C. 708
(1947) et seq. for the history of this attempted legislation.
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Could the measure-be law without these words? The Department
of Welfare and the Department of Justice, not to speak of numerous
other offices and officers, were deeply concerned over the matter. Com-
missioner Winston reported that many adoption proceedings had been
held in abeyance pending the effective date of the liberalized law and
that "the legal status and welfare of many children are at stake."' 08
She therefore turned to Attorney General McMullan for advice, and
he, in a letter to Governor Cherry,10 9 pointed out that it was the duty
of his office to incorporate the public laws in the General Statutes. He
was, however, "unable to determine whether . . . the Committee Sub-
stitute . should be included as a part of the codification of the laws
of North Carolina." After a detailed examination of the legislative
history of the bill, the attorney general raised the question whether the
enacting clause must be set forth in ipsissimis verbis, cited State v. Pat-
terson as the leading North Carolina precedent, and noted language in
the act indicative of intent to legislate. In recommending that the Gov-
ernor ask an advisory opinion, he pointed out that such an opinion
would allay doubts about the validity of adoption proceedings which
would otherwise certainly arise. "Any opinion expressed by me would
be inconclusive," concluded the attorney general, "and not in anywise
binding upon the Courts.""i 0 The governor in his letter requesting an
advisory opinion pointed out "that no case could arise" in the normal
course of litigation and reach the Supreme Court in time to avoid the
unfortunate results that would follow from reliance upon the questioned
statute should it later be held invalid."'
Impressed by the serious bearing of the problem upon "human and
property rights" and upon the administrative responsibilities of the
executive departments involved, the justices responded promptly and
unanimously. The provision of the Constitution setting forth the en-
acting clause "must be treated as a command. Its observance is essential
to the effectiveness of the act. To interpret the Constitution otherwise
would permit it to be ignored by the General Assembly, its creature."
The enacting clause must be regarded as of the substance of a law. 11"2
But could there not be a substitute for the precise words? Both Com-
missioner Winston and Attorney General McMullan had called attention
to the opinion in State v. Patterson,"-' wherein the Court, in holding an
act void for want of an enacting clause, had observed that "nothing
1"' Commissioner Winston to Attorney General McMullan, June 4, 1947. In
this letter Dr. Winston says, "We are requesting an advisory opinion by the
Supreme Court."
... Advisory Opinion in re House Bill No. 65, 227 N. C. 708 (1947) ; letter of
request, June 5, 1947, id. at 708-709; attorney general's letter, June 4, 1947, id. at
709-712; opinion, June 9, 1947, id. at 712-714.
no Id. at 712. 11" 1 d. at 709.
"- Id. at 713. 113 98 N. C. 660 (1887).
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appears as a substitute" for the clause. The attorney general had set
forth various expressions in the questioned legislation that might be
looked upon as a substitute.114 These suggested substitutes, designed to
show purpose to legislate, the justices rejected. "Moredver," they
wrote, "it nay be doubted whether any substitute for this form should
be deemed a compliance with the unequivocal requirement of the Con-
stitution."'' r And they concluded by informing the governor that the
adoption bill "was not enacted in conformity with the Constitution, and
must be regarded as inoperative and void."" 6
The justices were undoubtedly correct in their conclusion. It is
certainly not the business of courts to write into legislation vital passages
omitted by a careless legislature. But it may be asked properly whether
the dictum italicized above has any bearing on the use of joint reso-
lutions for legislative purposes. The Constitution plainly recognizes.
that law may be made by resolution." 7 The use of the joint resolution
for this purpose is as yet limited, but suppose it should be extended to
cover matters heretofore handled by act: Could such an extension be
challenged as unconstitutional and the lack of the prescribed enacting
clause in ipsissimis verbis be made one ground for such challenge?
Would the Court in such an instance recognize in the resolving clause
a proper substitute? And again, on grounds parallel to those given in
the 1947 advisory opinion, would the Court hold void a joint resolution
having a legislative purpose if the resolving clause were missing?" s Or
would it accept the kind of evidence of intent to legislate by resolution
that it rejected in the adoption law case and justify its action on the
ground that no specific resolving clause is required by the Constitution?
Sooner or later these questions may have to be answered.
CRITIQUE OF THE ADVISORY FUNCTION
It now becomes important to summarize the rules governing the
exercise of the advisory function in North Carolina and to-analyze the
authority of the advice given. The first and oldest doctrine is that
advice is given as a matter of courtesy to coordinate departments of
government. No advisory function is conferred by the Constitution
or statutes of North Carolina and no effort has ever been made by the
Court to find any basis for it in the early legal history of colony or state.
Second, the rule has finally emerged that advice will be given to the
legislature only when 'that body has determined to take action to the
execution of which its legal doubts constitute the only barrier. While
'1227 N. C. 710-711 (1947). 11. Id. at 714. Italics mine.8 Ibid. This statement, to say the least, does not sound like advice.
"I N. C. CousT., Art. I, §23, reads: "All bills and resolutions of a legislative
nature shall be read three times in each House before they pass into laws....
... No form of resolving clause is prescribed by the Constitution.
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the justices are unwilling to advise where action is a mere possibility,
they have not insisted that the legislature shall have settled upon one
course of action. They have instead allowed alternative courses to be
submitted 15rovided the General Assembly has decided to choose between
them.
Third, the justices are reluctant to give advice upon questions certain
to arise in litigation unless some broad public purpose is to be served
thereby. This is particularly true where private property rights are in-
volved and is exemplified by the refusal in the Homestead case and by
the cautious procedure years later in Judicial Tenure cases.
Finally, except for the deviations noted in the years 1917, 1919,
and 1921, the doctrine has been maintained officially that advisory opin-
ions are opinions of the individual justices and not of the Supreme Court
in its corporate capacity. In this attitude toward advisory opinions,
North Carolina is in agreement with all states except Colorado. Offi-
cially, then, these opinions in all states save one are "purely advisory,
and binding neither as decisions nor as precedents."1 10  The doctrines
of stare decisis and res ]udicata do not apply to them.12°  They bind
neither the giver nor the recipient.
But, if this is really fact and not merely theory, why did Professor
Thayer, writing more than a half century ago about advisory opinions,
warn that "it is of grave importance that the notion of their binding
quality should be dispelled ?"'' Exactly what is the status and force
of an advisory opinion in America generally and in North Carolina par-
ticularly? In Massachusetts, where the advisory function is more active
than in any other state, the justices "are bound most sedulously to
guard against any influence flowing from their previous consideration
if a [litigated] question later arises for decision."'' l One finds, how-
ever, that even in Massachusetts advisory opinions are freely cited, and
this is true also in other states. In North Carolina instances of citation
are numerous and any deviation from their doctrines has been deemed
to require judicial rationalization.1 23 One advisory opinion furnished
"110 H~av. L. Ray. 50 (1896). This point is emphasized by all authorities.
On the practice in Colorado see ELLNGVWOOD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 48-53, 259,
and the articles listed in the bibliographical note following the text of this article.
.
2 ELLNGWOOD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 223-237. See also Hudson, Advisory
Opinions, 37 HARv. L. Rxv. 983 (1924); Clovis & Updegraff, Advisory Opinions,
13 IA. L. Rr-v. 195 (1928).
' THAY R, LEGAL EssAYs 59 (1908).
... HUDSON, op. cit. supra note 120, at 983.
. The Court, speaking through Justice Rodman, refused to accept the definition
of the term "freehold" set forth in Waddell v. Berry, 31 N. C. 518, 519 (1848),
saying: "We do not feel ourselves bound by the opinion in that case, because it
was not a judicial opinion, that is, [it was] not given in any case which the court
had jurisdiction to decide, and the reasoning is almost altogether technical." State
v. Ragland, 75 N. C. 12, 13 (1876).
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the precedent upon which the Court based its jurisdiction over a litigated
case.'12
The first contention made by the friends of advisory opinions when
the question of authority is raised is that, as Judge Hudson put it,
-"binding quality is a matter of degree .... and while a matter handled
in an advisory opinion may not thereby become res judicata, still the
views given on solemn consideration by learned judges, acting. in their
official capacity, would seem to call for serious consideration. Stare
decisis is inapplicable, but short of that there is room for giving ad-
visory opinions great weight." 125 And such weight they have always
received
It is unquestionably true that advisory opinions should, as Jameson
put it, be accorded "no greater weight" than they deserve on account
of their "intrinsic merit."'120 Realists'know, however, that there is strong
compulsion in these opinions regardless of their intrinsic merit. At
least in North Carolina, the requestor-recipient has in evdry case fol-
lowed the advice given irrespective of its merit and in every case save
one there has been no subsequent governmental action contrary to that
advice.127 Governors and legislatures do not approach the judges unless
they intend to abide the result. To enact a measure after the justices
have called it unconstitutional, or to act administratively in the face of an
unfavorable opinion, would appear rash indeed in a land where the
judicial veto is universal. And private citizens would likewise gamble
against odds should they seek to compel administrators to act contrary
to the advice of the judges. To encourage clients to adopt such a course,
counsel would indeed have to be confident of their ground. Where
careful consideration has been given to formulating advice for the co-
ordinate branches of the government, there is strong presumption that
"'4 Farthing v. Carrington, 116 N. C. 315, 320, 22 S. E. 9, 11 (1895). In the
opinion of the Court, Justice Montgomery said: "And while ordinarily we might
dismiss the proceeding because the case is not full enough as to its statement of the
facts, yet where the matter involves great public interest, as does this matter, we
have decided to follow a late precedent of this Court---'Treat the case as in the
nature of a submission of the controversy without legal action.'" (Italics mine.)
The so-called precedent is the judicial Tenure opinion, 114 N. C. 923 (1894).
Justices Clark and Avery were severely critical of this use of the 1894 opinion.
116 N. C. 326, 330-322. Chief Justice Furches wrote an elaborate though not
convincing justification. His remarks are enlightening on the subject of the
Judicial Tenure case. Id. at 333-334. Smith, Advisory Opinions, 7 N. C. L. REv.
452, writing before the passage of the Declaratory Judgment Act of 1931 (N. C.
Pub. Laws, 1931, c. 102, p. 133; N. C. GEN. STAT. §§1-253 to 267 (1943)) says that
Farthing v. Carrington was the only declaratory judgment rendered by the Su-
preme Court.12s37 HARV. L. R-v. 983 (1924).
... Jameson, THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION; ITS HISTORY, POWERS, AND
MODE OF PROCEEDING, 364, §393 (3d ed. 1873).
17 The single exception occurred in 1871 when the legislature legislated re-
garding a constitutional convention in spite of the advisory opinion furnished to
Governor Caldwell. Sepra p. 308.
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the advice is correct. Even if the advice were incorrect, rumor has it
that judges of high courts are slower to see error in their own work
than in that of others.
Perhaps the commonly held doctrine that an advisory opinion is an
opinion of individual justices rather than of the court on which they
serve has some value in that-at least in the eyes of the judges-such an
opinion lacks the authority of an opinion rendered in a litigated case.
Advice may lack the sanctity of reasoning in a real controversy 'twixt
me and thee. The seekers after advice, the press, and the public, how-
ever, are scarcely aware of the difference. In North Carolina, as has
been shown, a very substantial fraction of the requests for advice have
asked for the Court's opinion, and the justices, in replying, have not
always made it clear that they were speaking only as individual justices;
indeed they have in a few instances replied as the Supreme Court. But
whatever the form of words in advisory opinions, the opinions are talked
of by recipients and by the press as official action. Ample evidence of
this is given in a footnote and in view of this evidence it is hard to
avoid Justice Reade's statement that questions come "to us as Justices,
as the Supreme Court. * * * And in whatever form we might answer,
the Legislature and the public will understand it to be the opinion of
the Supreme Court."128
It is the juncture in the same body of men of the right to interpret
and the power to decide that makes the advice of this body so much
sought-after. Theoretically the advice of the judges is no more official
or binding on legislatures and executives than the advice of the attorney
general. Actually, however, executives have been known to turn for
advice from the attorney general to the judges and have done so on
recommendation of that official. 2 9 Attorney General McMullan, for
example, in the Adoption Bill case, said: "The numerous adoption pro-
ceedings . . . now pending ... may be seriously imperiled and [their]
validity brought into question unless the answer to this problem is given
by such authority as may be provided in an advisory opinion of the
Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court. Any
opinion expressed by me would be inconclusive and not in anywise bind-
ing upon the Courts."' 30 The obvious implication of this language is
that advisory opinions do tend to bind the judges and that they do so
1 ""Legislative Tenure Opinion, 64 N. C. 793 (1870). Almost every reference
to an advisory opinion cited from the News and Observer speaks of advisory
opinions either as opinions or decisions of the Court. The members of the Gen-
eral Assembly in debate consistently do so. The Supreme Court did so in Farth-
ing v. Carrington, supra, note 124. As has previously been shown the advisory
opinions of 1917 and 1919 were rendered as opinions of the Court so far as lan-
guage may be taken as a guide. 227 N. C. 716, 717 (1947).
... Judicial Tenure Case, 114 N. C. 923 (1894).1
" 227 N. C. 712 (1947).
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is nowhere better illustrated than in Justice Clarkson's surrender in the
Constitutional Referendum case. 131  In the evolution of binding poten-
tialities in advisory opinions lurks some risk to all concerned. A writer
of a half century ago did not overstate the case when he said: "Admit-
ting that it [an advisory opinion] is purely advisory, it is an official act,
and can hardly fail to be prejudicial to parties adversely interested, and
to influence the officials of lower tribunals, as well as to bias the sub-
sequent opinions of the judges themselves if the question comes up for
actual decision.' 13 2
One of the most serious charges against advisory opinions is that
they are often more important in politics than in law. Under the guise
of answering legal and constitutional questions, the judges often play a
decisive role in settling political questions. When Waddell v. Berry
came before the judges, the Senate was equally balanced between Whigs
and Democrats (Loco-focos), and the effect of the advice rendered was
to maintain that balance and, simultaneously, to deny the right to vote
to many previously enfranchised North Carolinians. 133  In the Martin
case during the Civil War, the legislative effort to unseat the adjutant
general was allegedly directed by Daniel Fowle. When the justices ad-
vised Governor Vance that the adjutant general's office was indeed
vacant, the governor proceeded to make Fowle its new occupant. The
proceedings leading to this outcome were described by a contemporary
critic as the device of an "Astute Lawyer" (Fowle) by which the head
"of a most important office is turned out, and the son-in-law of the Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court ... put in his place."' 34
Again the element of politics entered into the 1870 Legislative Tenure
case. There seems to be little doubt that the members of the General
Assembly who desired to stretch their tenure from two years to four
1'x207 N. C. 880 (1935); supra p. 322. "210 HAxv. L. Rv. 50 (1897).
:"Men having mere equitable claims to land, many of whom had previously
enjoyed the franchise, were not "freeholders" within the meaning of the suffrage
provisions of the old constitution. 31 N. C. 516 at 527 (1848). "The points
made in the case doubtless had effect in creating a sentiment favorable to abolish-
ing the freehold qualification in electing Senators." 2 ASHE, HISTORY OF NORTH
CAROLINA, 472 (1925).
1' Letter signed "Compatible," March 27, 1863, in the Raleigh Register, April
1, 1863. The Raleigh Standard, W. W. Holden's paper, on March 18, 1863, con-
tained the following editorial: "The result of this vexed question fully vindicates
the propriety and wisdom of the course adopted by Gov. Vance. Gen. Martin has
no ground for complaint, for he has had time to obtain legal advice as to his
supposed rights, and the case has been dispassionately tried by a tribunal of his
own selection; while Gov. Vance, by resorting to the Court for its decision, has
most probably avoided an unpleasant conflict with a subordinate, and at the same
time obtained for the Legislature, in declaring the office vacant, and for his own
action in appointing a new Adjutant General, the sanction of law, as expounded
by the highest judicial tribunal in the state."
That Daniel Fowle's first wife was Chief Justice Pearson's daughter is a well-
known fact. See BROOKs & LEFLER, THE PAPAS OF WALTER CLARK, 1857-1901,
556.
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believed Chief justice Pearson "favorable to the four-year term, and
it was probably thought that he would carry the court with him." 3 5
Justice Rodman, it will be recalled, deemed "the question . . . an ex-
clusively political one," which, so far as he could see, could "never ...
be made a legal question or a subject of judicial determination," and
Justice Reade, whose opinion has received ample attention above, frankly
looked on the whole manner as meddling in politics. 13 Governor Holden,
writing his memoirs years later, gave clear evidence that he had been
approached on the tenure question by the Chief Justice himself. 137 That
Governor Caldwell used the Supreme Court to make possible an admin-
istrative veto where no executive veto existed is too evident to require
argument.138 It is equally obvious that, in the Judicial Tenure case,
Governor Carr's request for an advisory opinion was designed to solve
a serious political question in time for party nominating machinery to
operate. 13 9 The Railroad Lease opinion was the product of a skillful
political strategem as is evident from the debates in the General Assem-
bly. Josephus Daniels saw it clearly in this light when he declared the
Senate substituted "a 'trick' bill" and added that the "decision of the
Supreme Court lifted out the snake that was devilishly coiled in it to
strike the people's interest at the proper stealthy moment. * * * The
railroad did not expect the people to seek light from the court. That
was a species of shrewd flank movement of which the railroad did not
think the stupid people capable."' 140 And, again, in its 1934 opinion
fixing November 1933 as the time of the next general election after the
1933 General Assembly, the justices performed yeoman service in sav-
ing the proposed constitution and its supporters from almost certain
defeat.' 4' The author has no disposition to say the judges erred in any
135 HAMILTON, RECONsTRucTioN IN NORT : CAROLINA, 408.138 Supra p. 306.
" Writing thirty years after the event, Ex-Governor Holden said: "One
morning, during the spring of 1870, Chief Justice Pearson called . .. at my
house. Among other things, he said, 'The Senate of this State had been chosen
for four years.' He said . . . he could prove it beyond question. He said he
hoped I would confer with him, and that I would aid him in a case to be made
up by the Supreme Court. I was surprised at the suggestion. * * * I said to
him: 'Judge, the people in voting for the Constitution no doubt believed they
were voting for two years for the Senate, and not four years. And besides it is
written the different departments of government shall be kept always separate
and distinct. According to this rule I could not beforehand confer with the
court.' He seemed to be, as he no doubt was, profoundly in earnest. The Senate
at that time was by two-thirds Republican. It was the first Senate under the
new Constitution. I did not think of the matter any more until I was impeached."
MEmoiRs OF W. W. HOLDEN, 159. W. K. Boyd, editor of Holden's memoirs, thinks
this conversation took place in the spring of 1869, and it may have, but it might
have taken place at any time between that date and the submission of the legis-
lative tenure question by the General Assembly in December 1869. Ibid. note 1.
18 Supra p. 308.
"' Superior Court Judge George A. Shuford to the Asheville Citizen, May
1894. Governors' Papers, Elias Carr, May-Aug., 1894.
140 Raleigh News and Observer, March 9, 1897. "41Supra p. 319.
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of the advisory opinions except those of 1933 and 1934; all he affirms
is that in the instances cited the judges were used, and can hardly have
avoided knowing the fact, for purposes in a large measure political.
Future of the Advisory Function.-Every indication for the future
points to more rather than less frequent calls for advisory opinions.
What is to be the attitude of the justices toward such a growing demand?
Three general courses are open to them: They may let matters rest as
they are and treat each request on its own merit without any com-
prehensive plan to improve the practice; they may take steps to improve
advisory procedures and to safeguard themselves against an over-
expansion of the function; or they may decline longer to serve the
executive and legislative branches in an advisory capacity.
If there are present defects and prospective risks in the performance
of advisory work, as it is believed that there are, the first course does
not commend itself. The choice lies, therefore, between a planned im-
provement and outright abandonment of the advisory function.
Ample precedent exists for abandonment. Of seven states where
advisory opinions were once given without constitutional or statutory
authorization, North Carolina alone still makes them available.Y42 Two
other states have been denied such advantages as may come from ad-
visory opinions although in one of them there was an advisory-opinion
statute on the books.1 43 The reasons given by the judges for abandon-
ing or rejecting the advisory function have been numerous, but they
have all tended to center on the concept of the separation of powers
and have revealed the strong predilection of American jurists for the
litigated case.' 4 4  For North Carolinians, these reasons were effectively
1
,
2Conn., Ky., Neb., N. Y., Okla, Pa.
1,3 In State v. Baughman, 38 Ohio 455 (1882), the judges refused to assume
the advisory function. In Minnesota an act providing that the governor, the
legislature, or "either house may, by resolution, request the opinion of the Su-
preme Court, or any one or more of the Judges thereof, upon a given subject,
and it shall be the duty of such Court or Judges, when so requested, respectfully,
to give such opinion in writing" (MINN. CoMP. STAT., Ch. 4, see. 15, quoted in
opinion and by ELLINGWOOD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 70, n. 293) was declared
unconstitutional as violating the constitutionally imposed doctrine of the separation
of powers. In re Application of the Senate, 10 Minn. 78 (1865).
" Supra note 143. In 1867, the Judges of the Connecticut Supreme Court of
Errors, after having given advice on two previous instances. (Opinion . . . de
Soldiers' Voting Act, 30 Conn. 591 (1863), and Opinion . . . de Negro Citizen-
ship, 32 Conn. 565 (1865) declined further to do so on the following grounds:
The practice was extra-judicial since no parties were before the Court and there
was nothing to adjudicate; the opinions being merely advisory, would bind no
one, "except perhaps as we ourselves, if sitting upon' an actual case "might be
inclined to adhere to an opinion which we had expressed"-an opinion "purely ex
parte" formed without assistance of counsel and reached in consultation "upon a
comparison of our several impressions"; and, finally, advisory action would "con-
flict with our judicial duties and . . .with the legislative duties" of the General
Assembly by leading to a pre-judgment of questions likely to come before the
courts and by causing improper judicial interference "with your separate and
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stated in 1870 by Justice Reade and, to a lesser degree, by Justice Rod-
man.14 5 The collective views of the numerous judges who have con-
demned advisory opinions here and in other states would furnish a
strong case should the present members of the Supreme Court wish to
use it.
It cannot be argued that were the North Carolina justices to refuse
to give further advice, their action would deny the executive and legis-
lative branches the competent legal counsel to which they are entitled.
For 80 years the law has imposed upon the attorney general the obliga-
tion "to give, when required, his opinion upon all questions of law
submitted to him by the general assembly, or either branch thereof, or
by the governor, auditor, treasurer, or any other state officer.' 140  The
existence of a similar provision in the law of Nebraska was one ground
for abandoning the advisory opinion there.147  Furthermore, the Gen-
eral Assembly of North Caroliha, in adopting the above quoted words
at the very session when the Homestead advisory opinion was rendered,
plainly indicated that they meant the attorney general to become their
regular counsellor.
It would therefore have been easy to have justified the abandonment
of the custom in 1870 and even easier after the 1871 joint resolution
independent rights and duties of legislation." Reply of the Judges, 33 Conn. 586-
588 (1867).
A number of advisory opinions were rendered in Nebraska, the last being In
re Board of Public Lands and Buildings, 37 Neb. 425 (1867). In dissenting from
his fellows in this case, Justice Noval held that courts "should refrain from con-
struing a statute or passing upon its constitutionality in advance of actual liti-
gation... * * * We are aware that this court has, in some instances, assumed to
answer questions submitted by the other branches of the state government." He
had assented reluctantly on two occasions, hut "it is time for the court to call a
halt, and entertain jurisdiction solely in causes where the same is conferred by
the constitution." Id. at 432 ff. Justice Noval's point of view, rejected at the
moment by his brethren, was adopted six months later when the Supreme Court
determined that, in the future, "only questions involved in matters of actual liti-
gation before the court will be entertained or judicially determined, and no opinion
will be filed in answer to any merely hypothetical question." 37 Neb. xiii, Rule
23, Jan. 4, 1894.
A refusal to give advice came from the pen of the late Benjamin N. Cardozo,
while serving as a judge of the New York Court of Appeals: "The function of the
courts [of New York] is to determine controversies between litigants. * * * They
do not give advisory opinions. The giving of such opinions is not the exercise of
the judicial function. * * * In this state the legislature is without power to charge
the courts with the performance of non-judicial duties. * * * We are asked by
an omnibus answer to an omnibus question to adjudge the rights of all. That is
not the way in which a system of case law develops. We deal with the par-
ticular instance; and we wait until it arises." Matter of State Industrial Com-
mission, 224 N. Y. 13 at 16, 17-18 (1918).
2
45 Supra p. 304.
" N. C. Pub. Laws, 1868-69, c. 270, sec. 82, par. 6, p. 634; N. C. GEN. STAT.
§114-2, par. 5 (1943).
7 Justice Noval, in his dissent In re the Boards, 37 Neb. 425 (1893) at
435, said: "In Nebraska the attorney general, not the supreme court, is the legal
adviser of the executive and legislative departments."
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condemning the advisory opinion of that year as "subversive of the
fundamental principles of the constitution.' 1 48  Lapse of time might
also have encouraged forthright renunciation in 1894 or in 1917. Today
such a course would be much more difficult to adopt and to justify on
convincing grounds, in spite of logic and out-of-state precedent that
could be brought to support it. Indeed a decision of the justices to
limit themselves to litigation, even if based on the strongest constitu-
tional grounds, might produce a reaction ending in an advisory opinion
statute or in a constitutional amendment imposing the function upon the
Court or its members. The Court might, of course, pronounce the
statute void, but it could limit the amendment only by interpretation.
It can scarcely be denied that the present situation in which usage fur-
nishes the foundation leaves the justices broader discretion than they
would have were advisory duties imposed upon them by positive law.
Furthermore, with the exception of the 1933 and 1934 instances, the
actual use of the advisory opinion has been wholesome. The 1870
legislature needed badly the legal and moral guidance furnished re-
spectively by Chief Justice Pearson and Associate Justice Rodman; the
state was saved an embarrassing and perhaps paralyzing conflict over
control of the military in the midst of the Civil War by the opinion in
Martin's case; the confusion over judicial tenures might have had
serious repercussions in 1894 had not the justices answered Governor
Carr as they did; and any effort to enforce the recent defective Adoption
Bill could well have produced many legal tangles of pitiable character.
Again, it should be remembered that the General Assembly of North
Carolina alone among American legislatures is unchecked by executive
veto. In other states governors are in a position to restrain legislative
bodies by threatening to veto objectionable bills, but in North Carolina
the only veto is judicial and the only admitted ground for the exercise
of this veto is the unconstitutionality of legislation. If there is any-
thing in the argument that advisory opinions save the legislature from
enacting measures only to have them subsequently outlawed, then this
argument would seem to apply in North Carolina with even greater
force than in the forty-seven states where the governor can stand be-
tween the fundamental law and a self-willed legislature.
The inevitable conclusion, based in part upon the peculiar state of
affairs in North Carolina, is that abandonment of the advisory function
is impracticable. A well-planned improvement of the advisory tech-,
nique and an amplification of existing safeguards are, on the contrary,
thoroughly practicable and highly desirable. It is suggested that the
improvement include the following seven points:
1. That greater emphasis be placed upon the extraordinary char-
"' Supra note 30.
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acter of the advisory function. The judges should insist that they will
advise the coordinate branches of the government only upon questions
so important and on occasions so solemn that no other course of action
seems appropriate. For all normal circumstances legislatures and execu-
tives should be left to their own resources. The lawfully designated
adviser of the executive and the legislature is the attorney-general and
neither they nor he should be encouraged at any time to transfer this
responsibility to the judges.
2. That the justices refuse to give advice hurriedly. The judges
should make it a fixed rule never to act in haste. The advisory func-
tion, realistically viewed, carries tremendous power and commensurate
responsibility. Hence not much need be said about haste-a self-
confessed fault in some states. The judges in North Carolina have
several times supplied advice within twenty-four hours of the request and
on one occasion have responded on the evening of the same day. Unless
they were forewarned of these requests-as well they may have been-
they must have acted hurriedly; either that, or the questions put to them
were of such simplicity as scarcely to have merited reference in the first
place. Sometimes a legislature hurrying toward final adjournment will
be tempted, as was the House of Representatives of 1897, to seek advice
on Friday and "respectfully" allow the judges until Saturday to furnish
it.1 49 To accede to such a request obviously lays judges open to the
charge of giving "horse-back opinions." Surely a semblance of de-
liberation is essential to the judicial process.
3. That briefs be taken and oral argument be heard. All risk of
haste would disappear if the justices were to take adequate precautions
against unadvised action. Litigated cases, when they reach the Supreme
Court, have been battled out in lower courts by professional adversaries
before qualified judges operating under well-defined rules. Upon appeal
to the Supreme Court, briefs are filed and oral argument takes place.
The possibilities and implications of a case are, or at least may be,
explored thoroughly. How different is the situation when the justices
are performing their advisory function! According to present practice,
there are neither counsel nor briefs nor oral arguments. Some writers
and some courts have assumed this to be a necessary situation.150 But
14 120 N. C. 433 (1897).
... See note on advisory opinions, 10 HA-v. L. REV. 50 (1897). Hudson, 37 id.
,983 says: "It seems to have been assumed by the Missouri judges that counsel
could not be heard. The Massachusetts justices have complained on more than
one occasion that they were compelled to act without sufficient assistance from
counsel, and in one instance [190 Mass. 611, 77 N. E. 820 (1906)] they have
referred to advisory opinions as 'necessarily given without the aid of arguments
of counsel.' It is difficult to see why this should be true. The court could easily
tall in arnici curiae, and the Massachusetts court did once hear argument [Adams
v. Bucklin, 7 Pick. 121, 125 (1828)], and occasionally now receives briefs."
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it is not necessary; neither is it the unbroken practice in a number of;
states, including North Carolina. In Waddell v. Berry, the first of the
advisory opinions, Chief Justice Ruffin said :1al
"The Judges would have been gratified to have heard, before
forming their opinion, an argument on the part of the gentlemen
concerned on opposite sides; and, if the matter of law, involved
in the questions of the Senate, were deemed by them doubtful,
they would have been obliged to defer their answer until the
parties or their counsel could submit their views."
Obviously, Ruffin and his colleagues believed that a formal presentation
of the issues involved would normally be as essential in advisory matters
as in litigated cases. When the Martin case was considered in 1863,
not only was an agreed statement of facts submitted to the judges but
the judges heard argument from two of the ablest members of the bar." 2
Again in the Judicial Tenure case, the judges had the benefit of a "well-
considered and strong argument" submitted by Attorney General Os-
borne and also, on the opposite side, of "powerful presentations" of
"some others of the ablest and most learned members of the legal
profession."'153 More recently conferences with legislative committees
responsible for requests and various documents submitted with the re-
quests-for example, statements prepared by the attorney general-have
aided the members of the Court.' 54 Sufficient precedent clearly exists
in the practice of North Carolina to justify the judges in insisting upon
an adequate formal presentation of the problems upon which their advice
is asked.
This local precedent is strengthened by wholesome experience in a
number of other states. Thirty years ago in Delaware, in response to a
gubernatorial request for advice, the judges wrote: "We think our opin-
ion should not be based upon a hasty and imperfect consideration of
the matter .... To that end we have concluded that at least a week's
time is essential, and that an opportunity should be given to any attorneys
who may desire to argue before us either side of the question. We * * *
will be pleased to hear and consider any arguments that may be sub-
ELLINGWOOD, op. cit. supra note 2, at 80, 81, 190, 206-207, gives evidence concerning
the extensive use of amici curiae in Canada and some states. CLOVIS AND UPDE-
GRF F, supra note 120, at 195, believe it would be desirable to require the attorney
general of a state "in all cases involving advisory opinions, to furnish briefs both
pro and contra." See also it re the Constitutional Convention, 55 R. I. 68 (1935).
15131 N. C. 519 (1849), 40 N. C., appendix, p. 306.
152 B. F. Moore appeared for the attorney general; Thomas Bragg for General
Martin. 60 N. C. 156 (1863). Moore's argument appears in the Raleigh Standard,
March 18, 1863.
153114 N. C. 925-926 (1894).
154 See Chief Justice Clark, Municipal Finance Bill opinion, 227 N. C. 719;
Raleigh News and Observer, Feb. 7, 1925; and the Yelton, Phillips, and Adoption
Bill opinions, 223 N. C. 848, 226 N. C. 774, 227 N. C. 709.'
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mitted either orally or in writing."'155 As a result of this invitation the
attorney general and eight other lawyers argued the question. Even
more striking was an action taken in 1935 by Rhode Island judges.156
For fifty-two years an advisory opinion virtually outlawing constitu-
tional conventions in the state had excited the ire of authorities.157 In
language unusually frank for judges criticizing the work of their prede-
cessors, the 1935 justices set forth fully the haste under which the 1883
opinion had been given and added that their predecessors had "evidently
... had no assistance from counsel.' 158  Faced with a new opportunity
to advise on the legality of constitutional conventions in Rhode Island,
the 1935 justices "deemed it of utmost importance . . . to exhaust every
avenue of information that would assist us in giving our opinion. Ac-
cordingly, we have largely laid aside other duties pressing upon us and
have devoted ourselves to a thorough, painstaking examination of the
authorities and a careful review of the legislative precedents and practice
of Rhode Island.... In this we have been ably assisted by outstanding
leaders of our bar, including the attorney general of the state, who at
our invitation appeared before us and argued these intricate constitu-
tional questions. In addition we have had also the benefit of their well-
prepared and exhaustive briefs."'15  The result was a reversal of the
"ill considered and hastily prepared" opinion of a half-century's standing
as "entitled to little or no weight, in spite of the ability and character of
the men who joined in it."' 10
What the judges of Delaware and Rhode Island have taken liberty to
do on their own initiative, the judges of Alabama have been empowered
to do by statute. Section 3 of the Alabama Advisory Opinion Act of
1923 states that the justices "may request briefs from the attorney gen-
eral and may receive briefs from other attorneys as amici curiae, as to
such questions as may be propounded to them for their answers."
1 1
In view of these several actions, the recommendations of numerous care-
ful students-Hudson, Frankfurter, Clovis, Updegraff, and Elling-
2ib re School Code of 1919, 30 Del. 406, 409, 108 At!. 39, 40 (1919). On this
instance see HUDSON, op. cit. sipra note 120, at 983-984.
I" re the Constitutional Convention, 55 R. I. 56 (1935).
'In re the Constitutional Convention, 14 R. I. 649 (1883). Frankfurter,
Note on Advisory Opinions, 37 HAiy. L. REv. 1008 n. 18 (1924), points to this
case as striking evidence of the potential shortcomings of the advisory opinion
even where problems of the organization of government are concerned. "Even
on technical questions concerning merely the internal structure of government," he
says, "ill-considered advisory opinions before the event may become mill-stones
around the necks of succeeding generations."55 R. I. 69 (1935).1 Id. at 60.60Id. at 69.
.. An Act to Provide for Obtaining the Opinion of the Justices of the Su-
preme Court, or a Majority Thereof, by the Governor or Either House of the
Legislature Upon Important Constitutional Questions. Ala. General Acts, 1923,
pp. 25-26; Ala. Code 1940, Title 13, §36.
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wood 62 -and of the favorable background in this state, it is difficult tci
see any substantial reason why the practice of brief-taking and argu-
ment should not be adopted regularly in North Carolina.
4. That a rule of unlanimity be established. It is doubtful that ad-
vice should be given when the judges are unable to reach a genuinely
unanimous conclusion. Divided opinions are often unavoidable in liti-
gated cases where fully developed problems of law in their relationship
to facts are at issue, but advisory opinions, especially when concerned
with legislative proposals, are too often arrived at in an atmosphere of
unreality divorced from fact-a condition intensified when the proceed-
ings are purely ex parte. Divided opinions under such circumstances
ought not to be offered, for they only drak the personal views of the
judges into the vortex of legislative and political struggle.
5. That the grounds upon which advice is based always be stated.
Implicit in the preceding paragraph is the assumption that advisory opin-
ions should be opinions in the true sense of the word. To state mere
conclusions unsupported by reasons is not a sound practice. The un-
reasoned conclusion can be used by judges to cloak insufficient considera-
tion; it must be baffling to those on the opposite side of a question; it
reduces the opportunity of legislators to recast condemned proposals.
It smacks rather of "will and power" than of that light of reason which
supposedly guides the judicial process.
6. That advisory opinions never be given on proposed economic and
social legislation. Reference has already been made to the unrealistic
atmosphere likely to surround the judges when rendering advisory opin-
ions on constitutional questions. In no area is this factor more dis-
turbing than in that of economic and social legislation. If it is true, as
John Marshall once said it was, that the preeminent duty of the judges
is to say what the law is,"" it is equally true that the preeminent duty
of the legislature is to say what the law shall be. This duty the legis-
lature ought not to shift to others-be they executives or judges. When-
ever the legislature attempts to adopt a fresh approach to the economic
and social problems that confront our civilization, opponents have one
last resort, one Cato-like cry: "Furthermore the bill is unconstitutional."
In such cases it is all-too-easy for legislators to turn to judges and to
offer up their convictions upon the altar of their doubts. This is not as
it should be, for "constitutionality," as Felix Frankfurter long ago said,
"is not a fixed quality; in crucial cases it resolves itself into a judgment
upon facts. * * * [And] the history of modern legislation amply proves
that facts may often be established in support of measures after enact-
... Post., bibliographical note.X" Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cr. 137 at 178 (1803).
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ment although not in existence" l'reviously." 16 -4 Judges, in the opinioli
of the present writer, ought not to interfere with prospective legislation
in our industrialized age, by tdking sides as to its constitutionality. The
published reports of litigated.-cases contain quite as much judicial guid-
ance as any sitting legislatute is entitled to have. Students of the
United States Stipreme Coiirt know how difficult it often is for the
members of that Court to avbid substituting their own economic and
social predilections for those of the Congress.16  How much harder
Would it be were that exalted tribunal to engage directly in the legislative
proce.s via the advisory opinion!
Foffiiately in North Carolina, advisory opinions upon the constitu-
tionality of proposed' social and economic legislation have not as yet been
asked of the judges. But such requests are almost certain to be made
as urbanization'and industrialization go forward and the inevitable social
and economic issues demand settlement. When the requests do come, a
sound and sufficient reply would be that, until legislation has been
through the empiricism of administration, the judges will reserve judg-
ment upon questions of constitutionality. So placed on notice, no timid
General Assembly will be able to hide behind the robes of the judges.
7. That the authority of advisory opinions be defined. As these
opinions grow in number and importance of subject matter, they will
necessarily attract more and more attention. If they are reached after
receiving briefs and hearing argument and if they are well and carefully
reasoned, the natural inclination of lawyers to utilize them in the presen-
tation of regular litigation will increase, as will also the references to
them in the opinions of judges. There is a degree of danger in this and
10
" Frankfurter, Advisory Opinions: National, 1 ENCYCLOPAEDIA OF THE SOCIAL
ScIENCEs 478.
. A few examples of economic and social predilections of the justices will
suffice. In his concurring opinion condemning the income tax law of 1894, Justice
Field said: "The present assault upon capital is but the beginning. It will be the
stepping-stone to others, larger and more sweeping, till our present contests will
become a war of the poor against the rich; a war constantly growing in intensity
and bitterness." Pollock v. Farmer's Loan & Trust Co., 157 U. S. 429 at 607
(1895). In Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S. 45 at 57 (1905), Justice Peckham for
the Court declared that there was "no reasonable ground for interfering with the
liberty of person or the right of free contract, by determining the hours of labor
in the occupation of a baker"; and added, id. at 61, that "we do not believe in
the soundness of the views which uphold this law." Justice Holmes countered, in
what is p~rhaps his most famous dissent, that "this case is decided upon an eco-
nomic theory which a large part of the country does not entertain. * * * The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics.
* * * But a constitution is not intended to embody a particular economic theory,
whether of paternalism ... or of laissez faire." Id. at 75. It is not always thejudge with out-moded economic and social ideas who is influenced by his predilec-
tions. Brandeis, we are told, was not "governed by facts alone. Both as a lawyer
and a judge, the decisive factors were 'partly legal, partly sentimental and partly
a recognition of economic rights and a sound social policy.' Certain prejudices
and certain preferences formed a picture of an ideal society and predetermined his
stand." MASON, BRANDEIS: A FREE MAN'S LIFE, 578 (1946) ; and see id. at 620.
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it should be offset by a careful insistence that, in all citations to, and
quotations from, advisory opinions their character be clearly stated and
that all possible effort be made not to enshroud them in a cloak of author-
ity which characterizes opinions in litigated cases. The judges might
well declare at some appropriate moment, as did the legislature of Ala-
bama in 1923, that advisory opinions "shall not be binding upon the
State or any department thereof, nor even upon the departments request-
ing it, or the justices giving the opinions; but such opinions shall be
advisory merely."' 66 Nevertheless, advisory opinions are certainly en-
titled to such weight as their intrinsic merit warrants, and executives
and administrators acting in accordance with them should be entitled
at least to the same measure of protection that accrues when they follow
the formal advice of an attorney general. Alabama, in repealing the
language quoted above, found it desirable to give judicial advice equal
footing with the attorney general's advice where no conflict between the
views of the advisers existed, and to give judicial advice statutory pri-
ority when conflict did exist.1 67 There is, however, no need for such a
formal rule in North Carolina because the whole advisory practice is in
the keeping of the chief justice and associate justices of the Supreme
Court.
Thus limited and regulated the advisory function in North Carolina
need never again appear as a "ghost that slays" but can instead truly be
"a useful instrument of government."
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... Ala. General Acts, 1923, p. 25.
' Id., 1927, p. 103; Ala. Code 1940, Title 13, §36.
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see Frank W. Grinnell, Duty of the Court to Give Advisory Opinions, which is
Ch. 11 of The Constitutional History of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts from the Revolution to 1813, 2 MASs. L. Q. 542-552 (1917). Most of the
articles listed above throw light on the advisory opinion practice in Massachusetts
and that of Dubuque is largely devoted to it.
The Governors' Papers and the Governors' Letterbooks to which occasional
reference is made in the footnotes above are in manuscript and will be found in
the State Department of Archives and History, where, as always, I received
courteous and efficient attention. I am also indebted to Mr. Dillard S. Gardner,
Librarian and Marshal of the Supreme Court, to Mr. Adrian J. Newton, the Clerk
of the Supreme Court, to Miss Carrie L. Broughton, the State Librarian, and to
the members of their respective staffs for many helpful courtesies. My secretary,
Mrs. Frances M. Green, typed the manuscript and performed efficiently various
other tasks in connection with the prepartion of this article.
